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Abstract
In post-Keynesian literature, Hein (2012a) was the first to incorporate
financialization as an influential positive determinant of the rate of tech-
nological change. However, financialization is more like a two-edged sword
which can affect technological progress negatively as well. We capture both
the positive as well as the negative effect of financialization on technolog-
ical progress which encapsulates the possibility of multiple equilibria. In
analyzing the long run of the model we endogenize the financialization pa-
rameter as well. We then show how two subsystems (technological progress
and financialization dynamics) when interacts with each other, can produce
instability and cycles for the whole system. We show that under certain
circumstances, higher speed of diffusion of technological innovation, more
regulated financial markets, and higher intra-class competition among firms
are desirable for stabilizing the economy. Finally, we provide some policy
prescriptions for the same.
Keywords: Capital accumulation, Distribution, Financialization, Kaleck-
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1 Introduction:
The phenomenon of ‘financialization’ has an important role to play in explaining
developments in the world economy (specially for developed countries) over the
past four decades. Financial markets and agents play a prominent role in the
modern economy. Enormous increases in the size of the financial sector in one hand
and deregulation of the sector on the other hand are associated with significantly
changed income distribution in this era of financialization. Starting from 15%
in 1980s, the financial sector’s share of total profit for US economy tripled in
2007 with a peak of 45% in 2002 (Tomaskovic-Devey and Lin, 2011; Lin and
Tomaskovic-Devey, 2013). In case of non-financial sector firms, in the USA, the
ratio of financial income to realized profits more than doubled from 15% to 32%
with a peak of 42% in 2001(Lin and Tomaskovic-Devey, 2013). While there has
been an increase in profit share at the expense of wage share, at the same time
the share of rentiers’ income has increased at the cost of the share of the non-
financial sectors’ profit within the category of profit itself. In case of wage share,
blue-collar labours’ wage share has decreased while that of managerial income has
increased dramatically. Both, the share of capital out of national income and
the compensation of top corporate executives has increased significantly. Needless
to say income inequality has increased tremendously. The shift of power toward
rentiers and away from workers (because of the financialization), as Van Arnum
and Naples (2013) argue, is one of the primary reason for income inequality.
Financialization has transformed the functioning of the economic system at both
the micro and macro levels. For the last four decades for US economy, on the
one hand we observe a continuous invention and innovation of new technologies
and on the other hand an increasing engagement of non-financial businesses in
financial markets. Since the last three decades financial fragility has increased
enormously. We have observed the 1992 sterling crisis, the 1994 Mexican peso
crisis, the 1997 East Asian financial crisis, the 1999 and 2002 Brazilian financial
crisis, the Argentine financial crisis of 2001-021 and the latest financial crisis of
the USA (2007-08).
The intention of this paper is, first, to focus on how technological progress changes
through time, especially in the era of financialization in the context of US economy.
Second, to explain how the financialization parameter itself evolves over time. And
third, how the interaction between the technological progress and financialization
dynamics leads to fragility and instability in the economy. Superiority of our
1Palley (2013)
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analysis over Hein (2012a) lies on the fact that unlike Hein(2012a) (where in
the long run the economy always achieve a stable steady-state) by introducing
the financialization dynamics and allowing the possibility of nonlinearity of the
technological progress dynamics we are able to open up the possibility of long-
run instability in our model. While several economists and policymakers have
tried to explain the recent financial crisis of the US economy, this paper provides
an alternative way of looking into the problem. This paper also seek to explain
whether intra-class conflict among firms have any role to play for ensuring stability
in the economy, especially when the economy is in a prolonged stagnation.
We focus on the concept of financialization first. After that, we briefly discuss
the Keynesian and post-Keynesian literature regarding endogenous technological
change. Then we explain the distinctive features and novelty of our analysis
compared to the earlier literature. Finally we discuss the outline for the rest of
the paper.
‘financialization’ has emerged as a concept like ‘globalization’ for which not only
is a unique definition unavailable, but the precise form and usage of it is also
unclear. As a result, we find several definitions and various uses of the term.
Most acknowledged definition of the term comes from Epstein (2005) to whom
“Financialization means the increasing role of financial motives, financial mar-
kets, financial actors and financial institutions in the operation of the domestic
and international economies”. Orhangazi (2007, 2008) argues for two definition
of financialization2. At the general level, financialization refers to an increase in
the size and significance of financial markets, transactions, and institutions. At a
narrower level, however, he uses financialization to designate changes in the rela-
tionship between the non-financial corporate sector and financial markets. These
latter changes encapsulate, first, an increase in financial investments and hence
financial incomes of the NFCs; and second, an increase in financial market pres-
sure on the management of NFCs. This increase in pressure, which is exhibited
through governance debates revolving around ‘shareholder value orientation’, re-
sults in an increasing transfer of resources from NFCs to financial markets in the
2Among the other proponents of the concept ‘financialization’, for Dumenil and Levy (2004),
financialization means the structural change in the post-1980 era characterized by “the growth of
financial enterprises, the rising involvement of non-financial enterprises in financial operations,
the holding of large portfolios of shares and other securities by households, and so on”. Acknowl-
edging the vagueness of the concept, Stockhammer (2004) narrows down the definition and uses
of the concept, particularly in relation to the NFCs. For him, financialization is defined as the
engagement of non-financial businesses in financial markets. Krippner (2005) too contends for
a relatively narrow definition. As she point out “.....financialization as a pattern of accumula-
tion in which profits accrue primarily through financial channels rather than through trade and
commodity production”.
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forms of interest payments, dividend payments and stock buybacks. As the in-
tention of this paper is mainly to focus on the long run interaction between the
financialization rate and technological progress, to make the model simple and
tractable, following Hein (2010, 2012a, 2012b, 2014), in this paper we quite nar-
rowly define the concept of financialization rate as the notion of ‘shareholder value
orientation’. Lazonick and O’Sullivan (2000;) extensively discuss the concept of
‘shareholder value’ as a principle of corporate governance in the United States. As
they point out, there is a massive “transformation of US corporate strategy from
an orientation towards retention of corporate earnings and reinvestment in corpo-
rate growth through the 1970s to one of downsizing of corporate labour forces and
distribution of corporate earnings to shareholders”3 over the past few decades for
satisfying shareholders’ demand for distributed profits and for maintaning high
share prices. So, by the notion of ‘shareholder value orientation’ we emphasize on
this very change in objective of the managements4.
Most of the neo-Keynesian and post-Keynesian literature which treats techno-
logical progress as an endogenous phenomenon explain technological progress as
positively dependent on the rate of capital accumulation (e.g. Kaldor 1957, 1961,
1966; Rowthorn 1981; Dutt 1990; Taylor 1991; Lavoie 1992 etc). However, a signif-
icant amount of post-Keynesian literature considers the technological innovation
is being determined by income distribution as well (e.g. Taylor 1991; Cassetti
2003; Naastepad 2006; Dutt 2006, 2013). A basic argument of this literature is
that as wage share rises, firms face higher labour costs5 and this accelerates the
innovations of new labour-saving technologies, so that profit share can be pre-
vented from falling further. According to Dutt (2006, 2013), technological change
depends positively on the difference between the growth rate of labour demand
and labour supply. A rise in aggregate demand leads to an enhancement of labour
employment growth which in turn leads to a faster growth rate of technological
(labour-augmenting) change so that the problem of labour shortage is taken care
of. This argument is consistent with the impact of distributional variables on tech-
nological progress in the sense that a shortage of labour puts an upward pressure
on the wage share and this leads to labour-saving changes in technology6.
3Lazonick and O’Sullivan (2000; pp. 13)
4For more on ‘shareholder value’ see Froud et. al. (2000).
5One can argue that as labour costs rise, firms can increase the existing levels of prices.
Notwithstanding the fact that it might be possible, as firms face more difficulties in transferring
higher costs into prices they feel stronger incentives for adopting labour-saving innovations.
6Beyond these two variables (rate of capital accumulation and the wage/profit share), tech-
nological progress can be influenced by other phenomena as well. For example in a neo-
Schumpeterian post-Keynesian model of growth and distribution, Lima (2000) explores the rela-
tionship between market concentration and endogenous technological innovation. Borrowing an
idea from Schumpeter (1912, 1942) he argues that higher market power (concentration) by pro-
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Using a post-Kaleckian growth model, Hein (2010, 2012a, 2012b, 2014) examines
the effect of financialization (through an increase in shareholder power) on the
demand regime7 and on the productivity regime separately and then on the overall
regime of the model. Financialization, which is captured by increasing shareholder
power in Hein’s model for the analysis of both the demand and the productivity
regimes, is considered to be an exogenous variable. When the demand regime is
analysed, productivity growth is assumed to be an exogenous variable which is
endogenized later for the analysis of the productivity regime. In the analysis of
the overall regime, the equilibrium growth rate and the productivity growth both
are determined endogenously and finally, the effect of financialization (through a
rise in shareholder power) on both the regimes is derived.
Tridico and Pariboni (2018) use an empirical analysis to explain the main causes
of labour productivity slowdown in several developed countries. They first explain
how financialization8 leads to higher income inequality and then considering an
extended version of Sylos-Labini’s equation9 they find the labour productivity
growth rate to be positively dependent on the growth rate of GDP and the wage
share whereas income inequality and financialization both have a negative impact
on it.
The current paper is most closely related to Hein (2012a). Following Bhaduri
and Marglin (1990), Hein (2012a) assumes investment decisions to be positively
influenced by expected sales and by the profit share as both positively affect the
expected profit rate. Distributed profits by reducing the available internal funds
and limiting the access to external funds negatively affects investment demand. He
viding more internal financial resources give firms the incentive to spend on innovative activities.
On the other hand, high concentration (and hence weak competition) reduces the incentive to
innovate as firms with high monopoly power feel less threatened by their rivals. So, as he says,
the technological innovation depends non-linearly on market concentration.
Later on, in a post-Keynesian macro-model of accumulation, growth, and distribution Lima
(2004) captures the endogeneity of technological innovation. In this literature the rate of labour-
saving technological innovation by firms depends non-linearly on the distribution of income.
Distribution plays the crucial role as it provides the incentive to innovate and at the same time
provides the source (and availability) of funds for innovations. At a low level of wage share,
the availability of fund to innovate is high and dominates the incentives to innovate. On the
other hand, at a high level of wage share although the incentive for innovation is quite high
the availability of funds is low. It is the intermediate level of wage share where the rate of
technological innovation is maximum.
7In the analysis of demand regime, Hein (2010, 2012a, 2012b, 2014) analyzes the aggregate
demand and the rate of capital accumulation where he fixes the labour productivity growth at
a constant level. In the analysis of productivity regime he endogenizes the labour productivity
growth.
8They consider labour flexibility and ‘shareholder value orientation’ as the main aspects of
financialization.
9According to Sylos Labini (1999), growth rate of labour productivity depends mainly posi-
tively on the growth rate of GNP (Gross National Product), growth rate of wage share, and the
growth rate of relative cheapness of labour over capital.
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also incorporates technical progress as one of the variables determining the level
of investment. In his own language, the explanation is as follows. “Since technical
progress is embodied in capital stock, it will stimulate investment. Firms have to
invest in new machines and equipment in order to gain from productivity growth
that is made available by new technologies” (pp. 482).
An increase in shareholder power, as Hein (2012a) points out, affects the accu-
mulation rate through three channels. First, through the ‘preference channel’10
which is negative. Second, through the ‘internal finance channel’,11 the overall
effect of which is ambiguous. And third, the ‘distribution channel’12 which also
has an ambiguous effect on the capital accumulation. So the overall effect of a rise
in shareholder power on the equilibrium accumulation rate is ambiguous. It can
be ‘expansive’ i.e. there is a positive impact of a rise in shareholder power on the
accumulation rate or it can be ‘contractive’ i.e. an increase in shareholder power
will negatively affect the accumulation rate.
For a given capital accumulation rate, a change in shareholder power has a direct
positive effect on productivity growth and a negative indirect effect via the profit
share. So the overall effect of a rise in shareholder power on productivity growth
is ambiguous.
Given the fact that both demand regime and productivity regime are expansive,
with a rise in shareholder power, an overall expansive regime can be achieved
i.e. capital accumulation and productivity growth both increase in the face of
rising shareholder power. Similarly, if both the regimes are contractive, the overall
regime will be contractive too.
However, if the demand regime is contractive and the productivity regime is ex-
pansive and the contractive effect on the demand regime is relatively weak, we may
obtain an overall expansive regime while if the contractive effect on the demand
regime is relatively strong then we may obtain an overall contractive regime. If,
however, the partial effects on demand regime and productivity regime are neither
10‘shareholder value orientation’ influences managers’ (here firms’) to shift their preference
from retain the profit and reinvest it for enhancing the rate of capital accumulation to downsize
the labour forces and distribute the profit to the shareholders. “The preference for growth, and
hence the willingness to invest in capital stock, therefore suffers, too” (Hein ; 2012b, pp. 39).
This route through which shareholder power works is called the ‘preference channel’.
11Because of ‘shareholder value orientation’, firms are forced to distribute a higher share of
profit to the shareholders and hence are left with lower retention ratio. As a result, “internal
means of finance for real investment are reduced, and the ability to invest hence suffers” (Hein;
2012b, pp. 39). This route through which shareholder power works is called as ‘internal finance
channel’.
12The route through which shareholder power influences the distribution of income (between
wage share and profit share) can be called as ‘distribution channel’.
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too strong nor too weak then an overall intermediate regime is possible i.e. a slow
capital accumulation with fast productivity growth may co-exist. Exactly oppo-
site of the above happens if the demand regime is expansive and the productivity
regime is contractive.
Hein (2010, 2012a, 2012b, 2014) is the first and to our best knowledge only con-
tribution for the the literature who focuses on the impact of financialization on
productivity growth (or technological change) from a theoretical perspective. The
basic structure of our model is based on Hein (2012a). However, compared to Hein
(2010, 2012a, 2012b, 2014) this paper has a few distinct features.
First, in Hein (2012a), technical progress implies an increment in output-labour
ratio or labour productivity. In his paper, although the labour productivity is
increasing, the wage share is not changing because of that. This is possible only
when some implicit assumption is made regarding the fact that wage rate is in-
creasing in accordance with the increment in labour productivity. But for the
USA, for last four decades, real wage rate has not grown with the same pace as
labour productivity. Thus, it is hard to believe that wage share in unaffected
due to a rise in labour productivity. However, our paper is free from this kind of
problem.
Second, Hein (2012a) points out that if ‘shareholder value orientation’ goes too far,
a potential negative impact of it on labour productivity is possible. Nonetheless,
his basic analysis is based on a simple linear positive relationship between ‘share-
holder value orientation’ and labour productivity which ensures the unique and
stable steady state only. However, in this paper by incorporating both positive
and negative effects of financialization on the rate of technological progress, we get
a non-linear relationship between those two that allows the existence of multiple
equilibria and opens the possibility of instability in the economy. In our analysis of
the long run, we provide the rationale for the assumed non-linear relation between
degree of financialization and technological progress. This, in our opinion, is more
appropriate for explaining developments in the US economy which has become
more fragile and unstable for the last several decades.
Third, so far most of the literatures captures financialization as an exogenous
parameter and explain its impact on the economy by the change in that very
parameter. The novelty of this paper is we are trying to explain how this finan-
cialization parameter itself evolves through time (in other words we are trying to
endogenize this financialization parameter in the long run). We then show how
one stable and one unstable subsystem (represented by technological progress and
financialization dynamics) can interact with each other to produce instability and
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cycles in the whole system. We show that higher speed of diffusion of technological
innovation, more regulated financial markets, and higher intra-class competition
among firms are desirable for stabilizing the economy. We discuss some policy
prescription for the same as well.
The outline of the rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 sets up the model,
presents a short run analysis including short run comparative statics. Section 3
discusses the long run where we endogenize the financialization parameter and the
technological progress. Section 3.1 talks about the possible cases that may arise
because of the interaction between financialization and technological progress.
This is followed by the section 3.2 where using Andronov-Hopf bifurcation we
analyze how the interaction between financialization and technological innovation
can produce limit cycles. Section 3.3 discusses the comparative statics. Section 4
offers some concluding remarks.
2 The Model
Our short run analysis is completely based on Hein (2012a). We assume a simple
one-sector, closed economy, post-Kaleckian growth model in which the economy
consists of workers, rentiers, and firms. There is no government intervention in the
economy. For simplicity we assume lack of depreciation of capital and only labour
saving and capital-embodied technical progress prevails in the economy. Technical
progress thus implies an increment in output-labour ratio or labour productivity
(a = Y/L)13 . The rate of capacity utilization (u) is given by the ratio of actual
real output to capital stock. As long as the potential output-capital ratio is fixed,
the actual output-capital ratio can be used as a proxy for the degree of capacity
utilization.
The market is oligopolistic in nature where price (p) is determined by mark-up on
prime cost. For simplicity, we assume away the cost of raw materials and overhead
cost and consider labour cost as the only cost of production. So price is given by
the following equation as
p = [1 +m(Ω)]
wL
Y
⇒ p = [1 +m(Ω)]w
a
; m > 0,
∂m
∂Ω
≥ 0 (2.1)
13The capital-labour ratio (k = K/L) increases at the same rate as labour productivity, and
hence the capital-potential output ratio (v = K/Y P ) remains unchanged. Basically we assume a
Harrod-neutral technical progress, as in Rowthorn (1981) and Hein (2010, 2012a, 2012b, 2014).
In this paper, technological progress and labour productivity growth are used interchangeably.
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m denotes the mark-up rate and a = Y
L
is labour productivity. Total wage share
equals to WL
pY
= ω
a
, where ω is real wage rate. Ω represents the financialization
rate14. Note that Ω ∈ [0, 1].
So, share of profit is pi = (1 − ω
a
). It can be expressed as the ratio of total profit
to the nominal level of income as well i.e.
pi =
R
pY
=
m
1 +m
;
∂pi
∂Ω
≥ 0 (2.2)
The markup and the profit share both may change with respect to a change in
shareholder power vis-à-vis management and labourers15. A rise in shareholder
power (because of mergers, acquisitions and hostile takeovers) can potentially
reduce the degree of competition in the goods market and the ‘downsize and
redistribute’ strategy and of firms lowers the bargaining power of labour unions
in the labour market. Thus an increase in financialization rate (Ω) (which mainly
is captured by the idea of a rise in ‘shareholder power’) is associated with an
increase in markup in firms’ pricing which is expressed in equation (2.1) and thus
it is associated with a rise in the share of profit16 (equation (2.2)). Rate of profit
is expressed as a product of share of profit and the degree of capacity utilization
and is expressed in the following equation as
r =
R
K
= piu (2.3)
A fraction of total profit is retained by the firms (RF ) and the rest is distributed
as dividends (paid on equity held by rentiers (RDiv)) and as interest payment
(paid on debt to the rentiers (RInt)). Thus total distributed profit (RR) consists
of dividend and the interest payment to the rentiers. This argument is captured
by the next equation as
R = RF +RInt +RDiv = RF +RR (2.4)
Dividing both side of the above equation with respect to the nominal value of
capital stock we get rate of profit as a summation of firms’ profit rate (rF ) and
rentiers’ profit rate (rR) i.e.
r = rF + rR (2.5)
14To make the model simple and tractable, following Hein (2010, 2012a, 2012b, 2014), in this
paper we quite narrowly define the concept of financialization rate as the notion of ’shareholder
value orientation’.
15 ∂pi
∂Ω =
∂pi
∂m
∂m
∂Ω =
1
(1+m)2
∂pi
∂Ω ≥ 0.
16For a detailed discussion on how financialization affects the markup, share of profits and
distributed profits see Hein (2012a) pp. 480.
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rR =
RR
K
;
∂rR
∂Ω
> 0 (2.6)
rF =
RF
K
(2.7)
Following Hein (2012a), we assume that a rise in shareholder power leads to an
enhancement in the rentiers’ profit rate. As long as there is a given total rate of
profit, a given capital-potential output ratio, given income distribution between
capital and labour, and a given rate of capacity utilization, a rise in the rentiers’
rate of profit leads to a decrease in the firms’ profit rate. However, as long as the
degree of capacity utilization itself is endogenous, there is a very little scope for
the rate of profit to remain constant. Although, in light of a strong contractive
macroeconomic effect on the overall profit rate, there is a possibility that a rise in
shareholder power can potentially reduce the rentiers’ profit rate; for simplicity,
in accordance with Hein (2010, 2012a, 2012b, 2014), this possibility is excluded.
We assume workers spend all of their income (which is the wage income only)
whereas a fraction (sr) of rentiers’ income is saved. So total savings of the economy
consists of saving of the firms (which is essentially the retained profit) and the
savings of the rentiers i.e.
S = RF + srR
R = R−RR + srRR = R− (1− sr)RR (2.8)
Normalization of the above equation in terms of the existing capital stock yields,
S
K
= σ = piu− (1− sr)rR (2.9)
Following Hein (2012a) and Bhaduri-Marglin (1990), we assume investment deci-
sions to be positively influenced by expected sales (i.e. by the degree of capacity
utilization) and by the profit share as both positively affects the expected profit
rate. Distributed profits (i.e. dividends and interest payments to rentiers), by
reducing the available internal funds, negatively affects the investment demand
while at the same time it imposes restrictions on the access to external funds à la
Kalecki (1937). Following Hein (2012a), we assume inventions of new technologies
also positively influence the investment demand. This is happening because “firms
have to invest in new machines and equipment in order to gain from productivity
growth that is made available by new technologies17”. So, the investment function
17Hein (2012a).
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is
I
K
= g = α0 + α1u+ α2pi − α3rR + α4λ; α0, α1, α2, α3, α4 > 0; ∂α0
∂Ω
< 0,
∂rR
∂Ω
> 0
(2.10)
Here λ represents the technological progress or the growth rate of labour produc-
tivity. So λ = a˙
a
= aˆ.
In accordance with Hein (2012a), we assume increasing shareholder power vis-à-vis
management can reduce the available funds for real investment through ‘internal
finance channel’ and affects the management’s ‘animal spirit’ through ‘preference
channel’ which has been captured by ∂rR
∂Ω
> 0 and ∂α0
∂Ω
< 0 respectively.
In the short run equilibrium,
g = σ
⇒ α0 + α1u+ α2pi − α3rR + α4λ = piu− (1− sr)rR
⇒ u? = (α0 + α2pi + α4λ) + (1− sr − α3)r
R
(pi − α1) (2.11)
Keynesian stability condition requires responsiveness of investment demand due
to one unit change in aggregate demand to be less than that of the savings for the
same unit change in aggregate demand, i.e. pi > α1. Let’s assume the Keynesian
stability condition is satisfied. For a meaningful degree of capacity utilization the
numerator of the equation (2.11) must be positive i.e. α0 +α2pi+α4λ+ (1− sr −
α3)r
R > 0. When (1 − sr − α3) > 0 the numerator is unambiguously positive.
But if (1− sr − α3) < 0 then for the numerator to be positive α0 + α2pi + α4λ >∣∣(1 − sr − α3)rR∣∣ is required. Substituting the short-run equilibrium degree of
capacity utilization from (2.11) to (2.10) yields the short run equilibrium growth
rate of capital stocks as
g? = α0 + α1u
? + α2pi − α3rR + α4λ
⇒ g? = pi(α0 + α2pi + α4λ) + [α1(1− sr)− α3pi]r
R
(pi − α1) (2.12)
Lemma 1: (1− sr − α3) < 0→ [α1(1− sr)− α3pi] < 0
Proof: Suppose (1 − sr − α3) < 0. (1 − sr − α3) < 0 and (pi − α1) > 0 implies
α1(1− sr) < α1α3 < α3pi which in turn implies [α1(1− sr)− α3pi] < 0. 
Corollary L1: [α1(1− sr)− α3pi] > 0→ (1− sr − α3) > 0.
Proof: Suppose [α1(1− sr)− α3pi] > 0. [α1(1− sr)− α3pi] > 0 and (pi − α1) > 0
implies α1(1− sr) > α3pi > α1α3 which in turn implies (1− sr − α3) > 0. 
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Now let’s check whether the economy is in a wage-led or profit-led demand regime.
Partial differentiation of equation (2.11) w.r.t. pi yields
∂u?
∂pi
= −
{
(α0 + α1α2 + α4λ) + (1− sr − α3)rR
(pi − α1)2
}
(2.13)
Note that if (1 − sr − α3) > 0, (i.e. when the consumption propensity of the
rentiers is greater than the responsiveness of the investment demand due to a unit
change in the distributed profit) ∂u?
∂pi
is unambiguously negative. . However if
(1 − sr − α3) < 0, ∂u?∂pi R 0 according to whether
∣∣1 − sr − α3∣∣ R α0+α1α2+α4λrR .
There is another way of expressing this. Rearranging the equation (2.11) and
differentiating it w.r.t. pi we get,
u? + (pi − α1)∂u
?
∂pi
= α2
⇒ ∂u
?
∂pi
=
α2 − u?
(pi − α1) (2.14)
So ∂u?
∂pi
R 0 according to whether α2 R u? i.e. whether the economy is in a wage-led
or profit-led demand regime depends on the relative value of equilibrium degree
of capacity utilization relative to α2.
Differentiating g? w.r.t. pi and rearranging we get,
∂g?
∂pi
=
(α2pi − α1u?)
(pi − α1) (2.15)
So ∂g
?
∂pi
R 0 according to whether α2pi R α1u?.
Proposition 1: A profit-led demand regime implies a profit-led growth
regime.
Proof: Suppose the economy is in a profit-led demand regime. So α2 > u?.
α2 > u
? and (pi − α1) > 0 together imply α2pi > piu? > α1u? which means the
economy is in a profit-led growth regime. 
Corollary P1: A wage-led growth regime implies a wage-led demand
regime.
Proof: Straight forward. 
Now we discuss about the effect of a rise in growth rate of labour productivity
(i.e. an improvement in technological progress) on the aggregate demand and on
the equilibrium rate of capital accumulation in the following two propositions.
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Proposition 2: When the economy is in a profit-led demand regime, a
rise in labour productivity unambiguously increases the aggregate de-
mand while in the wage-led demand regime, the effect is ambiguous and
depends on whether α4 R
∣∣(α2 − u?)∂pi∂λ ∣∣.
Proof: Differentiation of the equilibrium degree of capacity utilization w.r.t. λ
yields
∂u?
∂λ
=
α4 + (α2 − u?)∂pi∂λ
(pi − α1)
In a profit-led demand regime (α2−u?) > 0 and so ∂u?∂λ is unambiguously positive.
But when the economy is in a wage-led demand regime, the effect of a rise in labour
productivity on the aggregate demand is ambiguous and depends on whether α4 R∣∣(α2 − u?)∂pi∂λ ∣∣ 
A unit rise in labour productivity on the one hand increases the investment demand
by α4 amount and on the other hand it enhances the share of profit . When
the economy is in a profit-led demand regime, these two channels reinforce each
other and as a result, there is an unambiguous positive effect of a rise in labour
productivity on the aggregate demand. However, when the economy is in a wage-
led demand regime, these two channels work in opposite directions and therefore
there is an ambiguous result of a rise in labour productivity on the aggregate
demand. If the direct impact of a change in labour productivity on the investment
demand is higher than the indirect impact of it through the change in share of
profit, labour productivity will have positive effect on the aggregate demand and
vice-versa.
Proposition 3: When the economy is in a profit-led growth regime, a
rise in labour productivity unambiguously increases the equilibrium rate
of capital accumulation while in the wage-led demand regime, the effect
is ambiguous and depends on whether α4pi R
∣∣(α2pi − α1u?)∂pi∂λ ∣∣.
Proof: Differentiation of the equilibrium rate of capital accumulation w.r.t. λ
yields
∂g?
∂λ
=
α4pi + (α2pi − α1u?)∂pi∂λ
(pi − α1)
In a profit-led demand regime (α2pi − α1u?) > 0 and so ∂u?∂λ is unambiguously
positive. But when the economy is in a wage-led demand regime, the effect of a
rise in labour productivity on the aggregate demand is ambiguous and depends
on whether α4pi R
∣∣(α2pi − α1u?)∂pi∂λ ∣∣ 
The economic intuition behind the result is that a rise in labour productivity has
a positive direct impact on the rate of capital accumulation and an indirect effect
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through its impact on share of profit. When the economy is in a profit-led growth
regime, labour productivity enhances share of profit which in turn enhance the
growth rate. As a result, the overall effect of a rise in labour productivity on the
equilibrium rate of capital accumulation is positive. However, when the economy is
in wage-led growth regime, these two effects (direct and indirect) work in opposite
directions and as a consequence we get an ambiguous result. If the direct effect
of a change in labour productivity is higher than the indirect effect of it through
the change in share of profit, labour productivity will have positive effect on the
equilibrium rate of capital accumulation and vice-versa.
Note that our results regarding the effect of a rise in growth rate of labour produc-
tivity on the aggregate demand and on the equilibrium rate of capital accumulation
is different from Hein (2012a). The effect of a rise in growth rate of labour produc-
tivity on the aggregate demand and on the equilibrium rate of capital accumulation
are always positive in Hein (2012a).
Now we concentrate on the effect of a rise in financialization rate (or a rise in
shareholder power) on the equilibrium degree of capacity utilization and accumu-
lation rate. Rearranging and partially differentiation equation (2.11) w.r.t. Ω we
get,
∂pi
∂Ω
u? + (pi − α1)∂u
?
∂Ω
=
∂α0
∂Ω
+ α2
∂pi
∂Ω
+ (1− sr − α3)∂r
R
∂Ω
⇒ ∂u
?
∂Ω
=
−︷︸︸︷
∂α0
∂Ω
+
+/−︷ ︸︸ ︷
(α2 − u?) ∂pi
∂Ω
+
+/−︷ ︸︸ ︷
(1− sr − α3)∂r
R
∂Ω
(pi − α1) (2.16)
The effect of financialization on the equilibrium degree of capacity utilization via
the ‘preference channel’, that has been captured by the expression ∂α0
∂Ω
, is neg-
ative. The impact of financialization via the ‘finance channel’, captured by the
third term of the numerator, however, is ambiguous and depends on the rentiers’
propensity to save and on the responsiveness of firms’ investment decision with
respect to distributed profits. Higher is the dividend payment, lower be the avail-
ability of internal fund for investment. However, higher dividend payment, on
the other hand, increases rentiers’ consumption demand that in turn indirectly in-
creases the investment demand. The overall effect of the ‘finance channel’ is hence
ambiguous. Finally, the second term, that represents the ‘distribution channel’, is
also ambiguous. This is happening due to the fact that any of either the wage-led
or the profit-led demand regime can prevail in the economy. If there is a wage-led
demand regime in the economy, the ‘distribution channel’ is negative. On the
other hand in the economy if there is a profit-led demand regime, the ‘distribution
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channel’ will be positive.
Proposition 4: ((1− sr − α3) < 0) ∧
(∣∣1− sr − α3∣∣ < α0+α1α2+α4λrR ) −→ ∂u?∂Ω < 0
Proof: Suppose (1 − sr − α3) < 0 and
∣∣1 − sr − α3∣∣ < α0+α1α2+α4λrR . These two
together imply ∂u?
∂pi
< 0 which means (from equation(2.14)) (α2 − u?) < 0. So,
∂α0
∂Ω
< 0, (α2 − u?) < 0, ∂pi∂Ω > 0, (1 − sr − α3) < 0, ∂r
R
∂Ω
> 0 and (pi − α1) > 0
together imply ∂u?
∂Ω
to be unambiguously negative.
From proposition 4 we infer that when (1−sr−α3) < 0 and the economy is in the
wage-led demand regime, a rise in shareholder power (i.e. financialization) will
have a contractionary effect on the aggregate demand (or the equilibrium degree
of capacity utilization).
Proposition 5: ((1− sr − α3) > 0)∧
(
(1− sr − α3) > −
∂α0
∂Ω
−(α2−u?) ∂pi∂Ω
∂rR
∂Ω
)
−→ ∂u?
∂Ω
>
0
Proof: Suppose (1 − sr − α3) > 0. This implies ∂u?∂pi < 0 which means (from
equation(2.14)) (α2−u?) < 0. Now if (1−sr−α3) > −
∂α0
∂Ω
−(α2−u?) ∂pi∂Ω
∂rR
∂Ω
then equation
(2.16) yields ∂u?
∂Ω
> 0. 
From proposition 5 it can be inferred that when (1− sr − α3) > 0 (which implies
the economy is in the wage-led demand regime), a rise in shareholder power will
have an expansionary effect on the aggregate demand (or the equilibrium degree
of capacity utilization) provided (1 − sr − α3) > −
∂α0
∂Ω
−(α2−u?) ∂pi∂Ω
∂rR
∂Ω
holds. That
means if the ‘finance channel’ (which is positive here) is sufficiently large, it can
overcompensate the depressing effect of other two channels and hence the impact
of a rise in financialization on the aggregate demand will be positive. Although
proposition 1, 4 and 5 are not explicitly discussed in Hein (2012a), one can easily
derive these results from Hein (2012a).
Now let’s focus on the impact of financialization on the equilibrium accumulation
rate. Rearranging and partially differentiation equation (2.12) w.r.t. Ω we get,
g?
∂pi
∂Ω
+ (pi − α1)∂g
?
∂Ω
= (α0 + α2pi + α4λ)
∂pi
∂Ω
+ pi(
∂α0
∂Ω
+ α2
∂pi
∂Ω
)
+ [α1(1− sr)− α3pi]∂r
R
∂Ω
− α2rR ∂pi
∂Ω
⇒ ∂g
?
∂Ω
=
−︷ ︸︸ ︷
pi
∂α0
∂Ω
+
+/−︷ ︸︸ ︷
[α1(1− sr)− α3pi] ∂r
R
∂Ω
+
+/−︷ ︸︸ ︷(
α2pi − α1u?
(pi − α1)
)
∂pi
∂Ω
(pi − α1)
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The effect of financialization via the ‘preference channel’, that has been captured
by the expression pi ∂α0
∂Ω
, is negative. The impact of financialization via the ‘finance
channel’, that has been captured by the second term of the numerator, however,
is ambiguous and depends on the rentiers’ propensity to save and on the respon-
siveness of firms’ investment decision with respect to distributed profits as well
as to capacity utilization. Higher the dividend payment lower the availability of
internal fund for investment. However, higher dividend payment, on the other
hand, increases rentiers’ consumption demand that in turn indirectly increases
the investment demand. The overall effect of the ‘finance channel’ is hence am-
biguous. Finally, the third term, that represents the ‘distribution channel’, is also
ambiguous. This ambiguity emerges since any kind of growth regime (wage-led or
profit-led) is possible in the economy.
As a final result, whether the impact of financialization on capital accumulation
is positive (or ‘expansive’) or negative (i.e. ‘contractive’) depends on the values of
different parameters. This argument is encapsulated in the following proposition.
Proposition 6:
(
(1− sr) > 1α1
[
−pi ∂α0
∂Ω
−
(
α2pi−α1u?
(pi−α1)
)
∂pi
∂Ω
∂rR
∂Ω
+ α3pi
])
−→ ∂g?
∂Ω
> 0
Proof: Suppose (1 − sr) > 1α1
[
−pi ∂α0
∂Ω
−
(
α2pi−α1u?
(pi−α1)
)
∂pi
∂Ω
∂rR
∂Ω
+ α3pi
]
. This, along with
(pi − α1) > 0 , imply ∂g?∂Ω > 0. 
Following Hein (2012a) we can say that the following conditions together ensure
the impact of financialization on capital accumulation to be positive or in other
word an ‘expansive’ growth regime will prevail if: (i) a low propensity to save out of
rentiers’ income (sr) (ii) less importance of distributed profits (and hence, internal
funds) for firms’ investment decisions i.e. smaller value of α3, comparatively lower
importance of the ‘preference channel’ for firms’ investment decisions relative to
the ‘finance channel’, and (iv) a high responsiveness of investment demand with
respect to the profit share. Otherwise the ‘contractive’ demand regime of capital
accumulation will be obtained. In the next section, we proceed for the long run
dynamics.
3 Long Run:
In this section, we analyse the dynamics of the technological progress and finan-
cialization rate. We assume that the short run equilibrium values are always
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attained in the long run. The long run equilibrium is defined as where techno-
logical progress and financialization rate remain constant over time. Let’s first
focus on the dynamics of technological progress which can be encapsulated by the
following three equations.
λ˙ = θ[λd − λ]; θ > 0
λd = ξ0 + ξ1g + ξ2(Ω− Ω2)− ξ3pi; ξ0, ξ1, ξ2, ξ3 > 0 (3.1)
So, λ˙ = θ[ξ0 + ξ1g + ξ2(Ω− Ω2)− ξ3pi − λ] (3.2)
The rate of technological innovation (or progress) varies according to the difference
between the desired rate of technological improvement desired by firms (λd), and
the actual rate of technological progress, λ. Everything else being unchanged,
whenever the desired rate is above the actual rate, the actual rate rises. This kind
of specification takes into account the existing lags between the moment when
expectations are formed and the moment when they are realized.
The desired rate of technological progress depends positively on the rate of capital
accumulation and negatively on the profit share. Beside Hein (2010, 2012a, 2012b,
2014) the first type of explanation can be found in (Kaldor 1957, 1961, 1966;
Rowthorn 1981; Dutt 1990; Taylor 1991; Lavoie 1992) and the second type in
(Taylor 1991; Cassetti 2003; Lima 2004; Naastepad 2006; Dutt 2006, 2013). Here
ξ1 represents the responsiveness of the desired technological change due to a unit
change in the accumulation rate whereas ξ3 denotes the responsiveness of the same
due to a unit change in the share of profit.
Following Hein (2010, 2012a, 2012b, 2014) we assume financialization has an im-
pact on the desired technological progress. He concludes this on the basis of the
fact that increasing shareholder power (Jensen/ Meckling 1976), higher demanded
dividend payouts by shareholders, weaker ability of firms to obtain new equity
finance through stock issues (because if it happens share prices decrease), higher
threat of hostile takeovers (Manne 1965), and the financial market-oriented re-
muneration schemes (Fama 1980) push management to use of the resources more
efficiently at their disposal. As Hein (2010, 2012a, 2012b, 2014) argues, this should
have positive impacts on labour productivity growth (i.e. on technology) and po-
tential growth of the economy, at least initially. However, according Jensen (2005)
and Rappaport(2005), as Hein (2010, 2012a, 2012b, 2014) points out, there may be
a negative impact on labour productivity if ‘shareholder value orientation’ goes too
far. In that case, share buybacks and dividend payouts can potentially dominate
the productivity-enhancing investment, and management’s short-termism under-
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mines the efficiency and productivity gains. So the effect of shareholder power
on productivity growth may be non-linear. However, in his model, he considers
only a directly linear positive partial effect of shareholder power on productivity.
Some evidence of negative impact of financialization on technology for the US
economy can be found in Lazonick (2014) as well. As he points out that although
Exxon Mobil spends about $21 billion a year on buybacks, spends virtually no
money on alternative energy research. In 2013 Intel’s expenditures on share re-
purchasing were almost four times the total ’National Nano-technology Initiative’
budget that was launched by the US government in 2001. Same is the story for US
pharmaceutical companies. Instead of spending sufficient funds on R&D they are
spending more on share buybacks. Novelty of our model is that we consider both
the positive and negative impact of financialization on technological progress. At
a lower level of financialization, an overall positive impact of financialization on
technological progress prevails whereas at the higher level of it the negative effect
dominates. This argument is captured by the third term of the right-hand side of
the equation (3.1)18. ξ2 represents the responsiveness of the desired technological
change due to (Ω−Ω2) unit change in the rate of financialization. In other words,
ξ2(1 − 2Ω) represents the responsiveness of the desired technological change due
to an unit change in the financialization rate.
ξ0 is the autonomous part of desired technological progress which represents all
catchall variables other than g, Ω and pi. One economic explanation for ξ0 can
be the following. For the sake of simplicity, suppose that there is neither any
impact of financialization nor there is distributional effect on the desired rate of
technological progress desired by the firms. Under this scenario, when there is a
stagnation in the economy, it’s the intra-class competition among firms that boosts
the desired technological change. When the economy is in the period of stagnation,
due to lack of sufficient demand, each firm tries to capture the existing market
share by out-competing others19. For this intra-class competition, they desire
higher growth in labour productivity (or higher desired technological progress).
This phenomenon is being encapsulated by the parameter ξ0.
θ represents the speed of adjustment parameter for the technological change dy-
namics. Higher is the value of θ, more instantaneous the adjustment of actual
technological progress to its desired level be. In line with Bhaduri (2006), we
18Note that if we assume ξ0, ξ1 and ξ3 to be zero then the technological progress only depends
on the financialization rate. In that case λ
∣∣∣∣
λ˙=0
= ξ2(Ω−Ω2) and so first order condition implies
dλ
dΩ = ξ2(1− 2Ω) = 0 =⇒ Ω0 = 12 . So ∀Ω ∈ (0,Ω0), dλdΩ > 0 and ∀Ω ∈ (Ω0, 1), dλdΩ < 0. But note
that ∀Ω ∈ (0, 1), λ > 0.
19We borrow this idea from Bhaduri (2006a, 2006b) and Shaikh(1978) whereas they themselves
find the idea in Marx
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can argue that the speed of adjustment parameter, among many other things,
depends on the speed of diffusion of technological innovations which in turn is
contingent upon the degree of restrictiveness enforced by patents, copyrights and
other intellectual property rights.
In equilibrium λ˙ = 0. That implies
λ
∣∣∣∣
λ˙=0
= ξ0 + ξ1g + ξ2(Ω− Ω2)− ξ3pi (3.3)
Putting Ω = 0 in the above equation we get the vertical intercept term as λ
∣∣∣∣Ω=0
λ˙=0
=
ξ0 + ξ1g(0)− ξ3pi(0). g(0) represents the equilibrium value of capital accumulation
when there is no financialization at all. Similarly pi(0) represents the share of
profit when the financialization rate is zero. Let’s assume ξ0 + ξ1g(0)− ξ3pi(0) > 0
i.e. there is a positive vertical intercept for the λ˙ = 0 isocline. When there is
no financialization at all, ξ0 + ξ1g(0)− ξ3pi(0) represents the desired technological
progress desired by the firms. Alternatively speaking, as long as ξ0 + ξ1g(0) −
ξ3pi(0) > 0, even if there is lack of financialization, positive technological progress
is possible. So the assumption λ
∣∣∣∣Ω=0
λ˙=0
> 0 is quite justified.
Slope of the λ˙ = 0 isocline can be yield by differentiating equation (3.3) w.r.t. Ω
as
dλ
dΩ
= ξ1
∂g
∂λ
dλ
dΩ
+ ξ1
∂g
∂Ω
+ ξ2(1− 2Ω)− ξ3∂pi
∂λ
dλ
dΩ
− ξ3 ∂pi
∂Ω
⇒ dλ
dΩ
∣∣∣∣
λ˙=0
=
ξ1
∂g
∂Ω
+ ξ2(1− 2Ω)− ξ3 ∂pi∂Ω
1− ξ1 ∂g∂λ + ξ3 ∂pi∂λ
(3.4)
Differentiating (3.2) partially w.r.t. λ we get,
∂λ˙
∂λ
= θ
[
ξ1
∂g
∂λ
− ξ3∂pi
∂λ
− 1
]
= θP (3.5)
Differentiating (3.2) partially w.r.t. Ω we get,
∂λ˙
∂Ω
= θ
[
ξ1
∂g
∂Ω
+ ξ2(1− 2Ω)− ξ3 ∂pi
∂Ω
]
= θQ (3.6)
Another way of getting the slope of the λ˙ = 0 isocline is
dλ
dΩ
∣∣∣∣
λ˙=0
= −θQ
θP
= −Q
P
=
ξ1
∂g
∂Ω
+ ξ2(1− 2Ω)− ξ3 ∂pi∂Ω
1− ξ1 ∂g∂λ + ξ3 ∂pi∂λ
(3.7)
Throughout this paper we assume (1 − ξ1 ∂g∂λ + ξ3 ∂pi∂λ) > 0. The justification of
19
the assumption is the following. Suppose for the time being that ∂pi
∂λ
= 0. Then
(1− ξ1 ∂g∂λ) = (1−ξ1α4)pi−α1(pi−α1) . Then we can easily justify that (1− ξ1
∂g
∂λ
) > 0 (i.e.{(1−
ξ1α4)pi − α1} > 0). Treeck (2008; pp. 396) mentions that for USA for the period
1982-2004, the value of α1 is 0.26 and the share of profit (pi) for the period 1985-
2004 is 30.05% (pp. 375). As stated by Knell (2004), the impact of (investment)
demand growth on productivity growth (i.e. ξ1) is 0.43 while Uni (2007) points
out it to be 0.44-0.75. However, Hein and Tarassow (2010) find out it to be 0.11
only. The impact of technological progress on the Investment to capital ratio (α4)
is very small too. So the assumption that {(1− ξ1α4)pi−α1} > 0 is quite justified.
However, if ∂pi
∂λ
> 0 then the reasoning for (1− ξ1 ∂g∂λ + ξ3 ∂pi∂λ) > 0 is the following.
1. Suppose the economy is in a strong wage-led growth regime. The wage-led
growth regime is so strong that here not only (α2pi − α1u?) is negative but also∣∣(α2pi−α1u?)∣∣∂pi∂λ > α4pi. So here ∂g∂λ < 0 and hence (1− ξ1 ∂g∂λ + ξ3 ∂pi∂λ) is unambigu-
ously positive.
2. Suppose the economy is in a weak wage-led growth regime so that here
∣∣(α2pi−
α1u
?)
∣∣∂pi
∂λ
< α4pi. So here ∂g∂λ > 0. Nonetheless (1 − ξ1 ∂g∂λ + ξ3 ∂pi∂λ) is positive here
as ∂g
∂λ
=
+︷︸︸︷
α4pi+
−︷ ︸︸ ︷
(α2pi − α1u?)∂pi
∂λ
(pi−α1) <
α4pi
(pi−α1) and as a result (1 − ξ1
∂g
∂λ
+ ξ3
∂pi
∂λ
) =
+︷ ︸︸ ︷
{(1− ξ1α4)pi − α1}−
−︷ ︸︸ ︷{
ξ1(α2pi − α1u?)∂pi
∂λ
}
(pi−α1) + ξ3
∂pi
∂λ
> {(1−ξ1α4)pi−α1}
(pi−α1) > 0.
3. Now suppose the economy is in a profit-led growth regime. Then ∂g
∂λ
=
+︷︸︸︷
α4pi+
+︷ ︸︸ ︷
(α2pi − α1u?)∂pi
∂λ
(pi−α1) >
α4pi
(pi−α1) > 0. So there is a possibility that (1 − ξ1
∂g
∂λ
+
ξ3
∂pi
∂λ
) =
+︷ ︸︸ ︷
{(1− ξ1α4)pi − α1}−
+︷ ︸︸ ︷{
ξ1(α2pi − α1u?)∂pi
∂λ
}
(pi−α1) + ξ3
∂pi
∂λ
< 0. If we assume the
effect of a rise in labour productivity on the share of profit (i.e. the distributional
effect of a change in labour productivity) is adequately weak, or if we assume ξ3
is sufficiently large then we may have (1− ξ1 ∂g∂λ + ξ3 ∂pi∂λ) > 0. For the sake of sim-
plicity let’s assume that in the profit led growth regime, the distributional effect
of a change in labour productivity is adequately weak or ξ3 is sufficiently large so
that we get (1− ξ1 ∂g∂λ + ξ3 ∂pi∂λ) to be positive.
As long as (1 − ξ1 ∂g∂λ + ξ3 ∂pi∂λ) > 0 then dλdΩ
∣∣∣∣
λ˙=0
R 0 depending on whether ξ1 ∂g∂Ω +
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ξ2(1 − 2Ω) − ξ3 ∂pi∂Ω R 0. dλdΩ
∣∣∣∣
λ˙=0
= 0 if Ω = Ω¯ = ξ1
∂g
∂Ω
+ξ2−ξ3 ∂pi∂Ω
2ξ2
= 0. So, if Ω < Ω¯
then dλ
dΩ
∣∣∣∣
λ˙=0
> 0 whereas Ω > Ω¯ ensures dλ
dΩ
∣∣∣∣
λ˙=0
to be negative. If ∂g
∂Ω
< 0 then
Ω¯ is positive only if ξ2 > ξ?2 =
(−ξ1 ∂g∂Ω + ξ3 ∂pi∂Ω). But if ∂g∂Ω > 0 then there is a
higher chance of Ω¯ to be positive and hence higher the plausibility of existence of
steady state at the downward part of the λ˙ = 0 isocline. So, given the value of
ξ1, ξ2, ξ3,
∂g
∂Ω
and ∂pi
∂Ω
, it’s the degree of financialization that plays a crucial role
for determining the slope of the λ˙ = 0 isocline. Higher the financialization rate
compared to the critical level of Ω (i.e. Ω¯), the negative the slope of the λ˙ = 0
isocline would be and vice versa.
Now suppose (1− ξ1 ∂g∂λ + ξ3 ∂pi∂λ) < 0. Then if Ω < Ω¯then dλdΩ
∣∣∣∣
λ˙=0
< 0 and if Ω > Ω¯
then dλ
dΩ
∣∣∣∣
λ˙=0
> 0. Next proposition talks about the possibility of stable equilibrium
technological progress provided there is no change in financialization rate at all.
Proposition 7: For a fixed value of Ω, the steady state technological
progress is stable.
Proof: From equation (3.2) we get,
∂λ˙
∂λ
∣∣∣∣
Ω is constant
= θ
[
ξ1
∂g
∂λ
− ξ3∂pi
∂λ
− 1
]
< 0 (by assumption)
So for a fixed values of Ω, the equilibrium technological progress is stable.
Let’s now focus on the change in the financialization parameter. Financialization
parameter changes according to the following set of equations as
Ω˙ = φ[Ωd − Ω]; φ ∈ (0, 1), Ω ∈[0, 1], Ωd ∈ [0, 1] (3.8)
Ωd = −η0 + η1λ+ η2g; η0, η1, η2 > 0 (3.9)
So, Ω˙ = φ[−η0 + η1λ+ η2g − Ω] (3.10)
The financialization rate varies according to the difference between the desired rate
of financialization (Ωd) arising from firms, and the actual rate of financialization,
Ω. Ceteris paribus, whenever the desired rate is above the actual rate, the actual
rate rises and vice versa. The beauty with this specification is that it takes care
of the existing lags between the moment when expectations are formed and the
moment when they are realized.
To encapsulate the idea that for a desired rate of financialization to prevail a
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minimum aggregate demand (or a minimum good economic condition) and a min-
imum technological sophistication are required, a negative constant term (−η0) is
introduced here.
Technological innovations20 (especially innovations in information and communi-
cations technology) has a positive impact on the desired financialization rate. It is
taken into account by the second term of the right hand side of the equation (3.9).
η1 represents the responsiveness of the desired financialization rate due to one unit
change in technological progress. In the long run a good economic condition, which
has been captured here by the rate of capital accumulation, positively influence
the financialization rate. During good times firms’ and financial institutions’ opti-
mism provide the environment of adopting riskier financial innovations and setups
which increases the rate of financialization. The justification of this argument
can be found in Minsky (1986). Minsky (1986) says “During periods of tranquil
expansion, profit-seeking financial institutions invent and reinvent ‘new’ forms of
money, substitutes for money in portfolios, and financing techniques for various
types of activity: financial innovation is a characteristic of our economy in good
times”. Minsky (1986, pp 271) also argues “...during good times, when banks are
confronted with a large demand for accommodation by apparently credit worthy
clients, the banking system is characterized by innovations that try to circumvent
Federal Reserve constraint. That is, bankers aim at having assets and non-equity
liabilities grow at least as fast (if not faster) than bank equity, whereas the Federal
Reserve tries to have bank liabilities subject to check grow at a slower rate than
bank equity.” However this characteristic can increases financial instability as is
clear by this argument of Minsky (1986, pp 354) “[A]s bankers pursue profits they
change the composition of their assets and liabilities; in particular, during good
times the interactions between bankers and their borrowing customers increase
the weight of assets reflecting speculative and Ponzi finance in the balance sheet
of banks.”
η2 represents the responsiveness of the desired financialization rate due to one unit
change in the degree of capacity utilization, whereas, φ21 represents the speed of
adjustment of the Ω−dynamics.
20Evidence regarding the impact of technological innovations on financialization can be found
in Drummer et. al (2017), Frame and White (2010).
21We assume φ ∈ (0, 1). Otherwise Ω can exceed its maximum value 1. Let’s take an example.
Suppose Ωd = 12 , Ω =
1
4 and φ = 4. Then from equation (3.8) we get Ω˙ = 1 and hence new
financialization rate Ω′ = Ω + Ω˙ = 54 > 1. But this is in contradiction with the assumption that
Ω ∈ [0, 1].
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In equilibrium Ω˙ = 0. That implies
λ
∣∣∣∣
Ω˙=0
=
η0 + Ω− η2g
η1
(3.11)
Putting Ω = 0 in the above equation we get the vertical intercept term as λ
∣∣∣∣Ω=0
Ω˙=0
=
η0−η2g(0)
η1
≷ 0. g(0) represents the equilibrium rate of capital accumulation when
there is no financialization at all. The horizontal intercept for the Ω˙ = 0 isocline
is Ω
∣∣∣∣λ=0
Ω˙=0
= η2g(λ = 0) − η0. Rearranging the vertical intercept of the Ω˙ = 0
isocline we get [−η0 + η1λ + η2g(0)] which represents the desired financialization
rate desired by the firms when there is no financialization at all.
Slope of the Ω˙ = 0 isocline can be yield by differentiating and rearranging equation
(3.11) w.r.t. Ω as
η1
dλ
dΩ
= 1− η2 ∂g
∂λ
dλ
dΩ
− η2 ∂g
∂Ω
⇒ dλ
dΩ
∣∣∣∣
Ω˙=0
=
1− η2 ∂g∂Ω
η1 + η2
∂g
∂λ
(3.12)
Differentiating (3.10) w.r.t. λ we get,
∂Ω˙
∂λ
= φ
[
η1 + η2
∂g
∂λ
]
= φM (3.13)
Note that as ∂g
∂λ
R 0. For simplicity let’s assume
[
η1 + η2
∂g
∂λ
]
is always positive i.e.
M > 0.
Differentiating (3.10) w.r.t. Ω we get,
∂Ω˙
∂Ω
= φ
[
η2
∂g
∂Ω
− 1
]
= φN (3.14)
Another way of getting the slope of the Ω˙ = 0 isocline is N
dλ
dΩ
∣∣∣∣
Ω˙=0
= − φN
φM
= −N
M
=
1− η2 ∂g∂Ω
η1 + η2
∂g
∂λ
(3.15)
Now let’s check for a given level of technological progress, how the Ω−dynamics
behaves. This analysis is captured by the following proposition.
Proposition 8: For a fixed value of λ, a contractionary effect of finan-
cialization on the rate of capital accumulation implies a stable equilib-
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rium financialization rate. However in case of an expansionary effect
of financialization on the rate of capital accumulation, an unstable equi-
librium financialization rate is possible.
Proof: From equation (3.10) we get,
∂Ω˙
∂Ω
∣∣∣∣
λ is constant
= φ
[
η2
∂g
∂Ω
− 1
]
If ∂g
∂Ω
< 0 then ∂Ω˙
∂Ω
∣∣∣∣
λ is constant
is unambiguously negative and hence for a fixed value
of λ, there would be a stable equilibrium level of financialization. However, if ∂g
∂Ω
>
0 then sign of ∂Ω˙
∂Ω
∣∣∣∣
λ is constant
would be ambiguous. For | ∂g
∂Ω
| > 1
η2
, ∂Ω˙
∂Ω
∣∣∣∣
λ is constant
> 0
is attained. 
The diagrams regarding the λ˙ = 0 isocline and the Ω˙ = 0 isocline are given in
figure 3.1.
In the next subsection we discuss the possible cases that may arise due to the
interaction between the financialization and technological progress dynamics.
3.1 Possible Cases:
Because of our assumption, (1 − ξ1 ∂g∂λ + ξ3 ∂pi∂λ) is postive which ensures P to be
negative.
For case 1 we assume ∂g
?
∂Ω
< 0 which in turn implies N to be unambiguously
negative.
Case 1.1: Let’s assume that the vertical intercept of the Ω˙ = 0 isocline is negative
i.e. λ
∣∣∣∣Ω=0
Ω˙=0
= η0−η2g(0)
η1
< 0. This is possible when η2g(0) > η0.
Consider point A: Here P < 0 (by assumption), Q < 0 (as Ω > Ω¯), M > 0 and
N < 0 (as ∂g
?
∂Ω
< 0).
At point A, slope of the Ω˙ = 0 isocline is greater than the slope of the λ˙ = 0
isocline i.e.
dλ
dΩ
∣∣∣∣
Ω˙=0
> 0 >
dλ
dΩ
∣∣∣∣
λ˙=0
⇒ − φN
φM
> −θQ
θP
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(a) Diagram of λ˙ = 0 isocline
(b) Diagram of Ω˙ = 0 isocline
Figure 3.1: diagrams of λ˙ = 0 and Ω˙ = 0 isoclines
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(a) (b)
Figure 3.2
⇒ θφ(PN −QM) > 0 (∵ P < 0 and M > 0)
So the determinant of the Jacobian matrix Det(J) = θφ[NP −MQ] > 0. Trace
of the matrix tr(J) = θP + φN = [θP + φQ] < 0. As a result, point A emerges as
a stable steady state. It is represented by figure 3.2(a).
Consider point B: Here P < 0 (by assumption), Q > 0 (as Ω < Ω¯), M > 0 and
N < 0 (as ∂g?
∂Ω
< 0).
At point B, slope of the Ω˙ = 0 isocline is greater than the slope of the λ˙ = 0
isocline i.e.
dλ
dΩ
∣∣∣∣
Ω˙=0
>
dλ
dΩ
∣∣∣∣
λ˙=0
> 0
⇒ − φN
φM
> −θQ
θP
⇒ θφ(PN −QM) > 0 (∵ P < 0 and M > 0)
So the determinant of the Jacobian matrix Det(J) > 0. Trace of the matrix
tr(J) = θP + φN < 0. Thus point B also is a stable equilibrium which is shown
in figure 3.2(b).
Consider point H: Here P < 0 (by assumption), Q = 0 (as Ω = Ω¯), M > 0 and
N < 0 (as ∂g
?
∂Ω
< 0).
At point B, slope of the Ω˙ = 0 isocline is greater than the slope of the λ˙ = 0
isocline i.e.
dλ
dΩ
∣∣∣∣
Ω˙=0
>
dλ
dΩ
∣∣∣∣
λ˙=0
= 0
⇒ − φN
φM
> −θQ
θP
⇒ θφ(PN −QM) = θφPN > 0 (∵ P < 0 and M > 0)
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(a) (b)
Figure 3.3
So the determinant of the Jacobian matrix Det(J) > 0. Trace of the matrix
tr(J) = θP + φN < 0. Thus point H also is a stable equilibrium.
From the above three points (A,B & H) we can infer the following proposition
Proposition 9: In case 1.1, as long as steady state exists, a contrac-
tionary effect of financialization on the rate of capital accumulation is
sufficient to ensure the stability of the steady state i.e. (∂g
?
∂Ω
< 0) −→
[Det(J) > 0∧tr(J) < 0)
Proof: Suppose ∂g
?
∂Ω
< 0. This ensuresN < 0. For case 1.1 P < 0 (by assumption),
Q R 0 (as Ω R Ω¯) and M > 0. For all the above three different types of points,
as we see, the determinant of the Jacobian matrix is positive and the trace is
negative. As a result, all the above three different types of equilibria are stable
steady states.
Now focus on the next sub-case.
Case 1.2: Let’s assume that the vertical intercept of the Ω˙ = 0 isocline is positive
i.e. λ
∣∣∣∣Ω=0
Ω˙=0
= η0−η2g(0)
η1
> 0. This is possible when η2g(0) < η. Let’s also assume
that the vertical intercept of the Ω˙ = 0 isocline is less than the vertical intercept
of the λ˙ = 0 isocline i.e. λ
∣∣∣∣Ω=0
λ˙=0
= ξ0 + ξ1g(0)− ξ3pi(0) > λ
∣∣∣∣Ω=0
Ω˙=0
= η0−η2g(0)
η1
> 0.
The equilibrium can be either point A, point B or point H. The analysis is same
as case 1.1. The diagram for this sub-case is represented by figure 3.3(a) & 3.3(b)
respectively.
Next, we discuss the last sub-case.
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Figure 3.4
Case 1.3: Let’s assume that the vertical intercept of the Ω˙ = 0 isocline is
positive and is greater than the vertical intercept of the λ˙ = 0 isocline i.e. λ
∣∣∣∣Ω=0
Ω˙=0
=
η0−η2g(0)
η1
> λ
∣∣∣∣Ω=0
λ˙=0
= ξ0 + ξ1g(0)− ξ3pi(0) > 0.
Consider point C: Here P < 0 (by assumption), Q > 0 (as Ω < Ω¯), M > 0 and
N < 0 (as ∂g
?
∂Ω
< 0).
At point A, slope of the Ω˙ = 0 isocline is less than the slope of the λ˙ = 0 isocline
i.e.
dλ
dΩ
∣∣∣∣
λ˙=0
>
dλ
dΩ
∣∣∣∣
Ω˙=0
> 0
⇒ −θQ
θP
> − φN
φM
⇒ θφ(PN −QM) < 0 (∵ P < 0 and M > 0)
So the determinant of the Jacobian matrix Det(J) < 0 and hence point C is a
saddle point.
Consider point D: Here P < 0 (by assumption), Q < 0 (as Ω > Ω¯), M > 0 and
N < 0 (as ∂g
?
∂Ω
< 0).
At point A, slope of the Ω˙ = 0 isocline is greater than the slope of the λ˙ = 0
isocline i.e.
dλ
dΩ
∣∣∣∣
Ω˙=0
> 0 >
dλ
dΩ
∣∣∣∣
λ˙=0
⇒ − φN
φM
> −θQ
θP
⇒ θφ(PN −QM) > 0 (∵ P < 0 and M > 0)
So the determinant of the Jacobian matrix Det(J) > 0. Trace of the matrix
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tr(J) = θP + φN < 0. Thus point D is a stable equilibrium. Diagram for case 1.3
is given in figure 3.4.
For the next case, Case 2, we assume ∂g
?
∂Ω
> 0 but ∂g
?
∂Ω
< 1
η2
i .e. N is negative.
Case 2.1: Let’s assume that the vertical intercept of the Ω˙ = 0 isocline is negative
i.e. λ
∣∣∣∣Ω=0
Ω˙=0
= η0−η2g(0)
η1
< 0. This is possible when η2g(0) > η0. Rest of the analysis
is same as case 1.1.
Case 2.2: Let’s assume that the vertical intercept of the Ω˙ = 0 isocline is positive
i.e. λ
∣∣∣∣Ω=0
Ω˙=0
= η0−η2g(0)
η1
> 0. This is possible when η2g(0) < η. Let’s also assume
that the vertical intercept of the Ω˙ = 0 isocline is less than the vertical intercept
of the λ˙ = 0 isocline i.e. λ
∣∣∣∣Ω=0
λ˙=0
= ξ0 + ξ1g(0)− ξ3pi(0) > λ
∣∣∣∣Ω=0
Ω˙=0
= η0−η2g(0)
η1
> 0.
Rest of the analysis is same as case 1.1.
Case 2.3: Let’s assume that the vertical intercept of the Ω˙ = 0 isocline is
positive and is greater than the vertical intercept of the λ˙ = 0 isocline i.e. λ
∣∣∣∣Ω=0
Ω˙=0
=
η0−η2g(0)
η1
> λ
∣∣∣∣Ω=0
λ˙=0
= ξ0 + ξ1g(0)− ξ3pi(0) > 0. Rest of the analysis is same as Case
1.3.
From cases 1 & 2 we can infer the following argument. Suppose the vertical
intercept of the Ω˙ = 0 isocline is less than the vertical intercept of the λ˙ = 0
isocline i.e. λ
∣∣∣∣Ω=0
Ω˙=0
= η0−η2g(0)
η1
> λ
∣∣∣∣Ω=0
λ˙=0
= ξ0 + ξ1g(0)− ξ3pi(0). Then the following
proposition holds.
Proposition 10: As long as a steady state exists and the intercept of the
Ω˙ = 0 isocline is greater than the slope of the λ˙ = 0 isocline, a contrac-
tionary effect of financialization on the rate of capital accumulation is
sufficient to ensure the stability of the steady state. However, if the
effect of financialization on the aggregate demand is expansionary but
not too strong (i.e. 0 < ∂g
?
∂Ω
< 1
η2
) then also a stable equilibrium can be
achieved.
Proof: See appendix A for the proof. 
For the next case, case 3, we assume ∂g
?
∂Ω
> 0 and ∂g
?
∂Ω
> 1
η2
i .e. N is positive.
Case 3.1: Let’s assume that the vertical intercept of the Ω˙ = 0 isocline is negative
i.e. λ
∣∣∣∣Ω=0
Ω˙=0
= η0−η2g(0)
η1
< 0. This is possible when η2g(0) > η0. No steady state is
possible here.
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(a) (b)
Figure 3.5
Case 3.2: Let’s assume that the vertical intercept of the Ω˙ = 0 isocline is positive
i.e. λ
∣∣∣∣Ω=0
Ω˙=0
= η0−η2g(0)
η1
> 0. This is possible when η2g(0) < η. Let’s also assume
that the vertical intercept of the Ω˙ = 0 isocline is less than the vertical intercept
of the λ˙ = 0 isocline i.e. λ
∣∣∣∣Ω=0
λ˙=0
= ξ0 + ξ1g(0)− ξ3pi(0) > λ
∣∣∣∣Ω=0
Ω˙=0
= η0−η2g(0)
η1
> 0.
Consider the only possible steady-state point F: Here P < 0 (by assump-
tion), Q < 0 (as Ω > Ω¯), M > 0 and N > 0 (as ∂g
?
∂Ω
> 1
η2
> 0).
At point F, slope of the Ω˙ = 0 isocline is greater than the slope of the λ˙ = 0
isocline i.e.
0 >
dλ
dΩ
∣∣∣∣
Ω˙=0
> 0
dλ
dΩ
∣∣∣∣
λ˙=0
⇒ − φN
φM
> −θQ
θP
⇒ θφ(PN −QM) > 0 (∵ P < 0 and M > 0)
So the determinant of the Jacobian matrixDet(J) > 0. Trace of the matrix tr(J) =
θP + φN R 0. Thus point F can be anything: stable or unstable equilibrium. See
figure 3.5(a) for the diagrammatic explanation.
Case 3.3: Let’s assume that the vertical intercept of the Ω˙ = 0 isocline is
positive and is greater than the vertical intercept of the λ˙ = 0 isocline i.e. λ
∣∣∣∣Ω=0
Ω˙=0
=
η0−η2g(0)
η1
> λ
∣∣∣∣Ω=0
λ˙=0
= ξ0 + ξ1g(0)− ξ3pi(0) > 0.
Consider point E: Here P < 0 (by assumption), Q > 0 (as Ω < Ω¯), M > 0 and
N > 0 (as ∂g
?
∂Ω
> 1
η2
> 0).
At point E, slope of the Ω˙ = 0 isocline is less than the slope of the λ˙ = 0 isocline
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i.e.
dλ
dΩ
∣∣∣∣
λ˙=0
> 0 >
dλ
dΩ
∣∣∣∣
Ω˙=0
⇒ −θQ
θP
> − φN
φM
⇒ θφ(PN −QM) < 0 (∵ P < 0 and M > 0)
So the determinant of the Jacobian matrix Det(J) < 0. Thus point E is a saddle
point.
Consider point F: Here the analysis is same as Case 3.2. See figure 3.5(b) for
the diagrammatic explanation.
3.2 Andronov-Hopf Bifurcation:
In this sub-section, we discuss the possibilities of emergence of cycle as a solution
to the dynamical systems represented by equation (3.2) and (3.10). Consider the
steady state F of the case 3.2 and/or 3.3. We get the following proposition.
Proposition 11: For an appropriate value of the speed of adjustment
parameter,θ, the characteristic equation to (3.2) & (3.10) evaluated at
the steady state F of the case 3.2 and 3.3 have purely imaginary roots
and for the same dynamical system, θ = θˆ provides a point of Andronov-
Hopf bifurcation22.
Proof: Provided in appendix B.
Note that for θ < θˆ, the trace become positive and hence we have an unstable
equilibrium. However when θ > θˆ, the equilibrium is stable. When θ falls to θˆ, the
system with a stable equilibrium point loses its stability and gives birth to a limit
cycle. Similarly if θ rises to θˆ, the system with an unstable steady state produces
a limit cycle23. We already have discussed that the speed of adjustment parameter
depends on the speed of diffusion of technological innovations. Bhaduri (2006b)
points out that faster diffusion rate of technological innovations is an important
parameter for fueling growth whereas at the very same time it has potential to
destabilize the steady growth path. In our model, on the contrary, higher speed
of diffusion of technological innovation is not necessary for fueling growth (as it
cannot stimulate the technological change itself), but is important for stabilizing
22For further discussion regarding Hopf-bifurcation see Gandolfo (1997), Izhikevich (2007)
23Note that the limit cycle can arise only when the expansionary effect of financialization on
the aggregate demand prevails.
31
the economy. So government intervention for loosening the degree of restrictiveness
enforced various intellectual property rights are desirable for ensuring the stability
in the economy.
Proposition 12: For an appropriate value of the speed of adjustment
parameter,φ, the characteristic equation to (3.2) & (3.10) evaluated
at the steady state F of the case 3.2 and 3.3 have purely imaginary
roots and for the same dynamical system, φ = φˆ provides a point of
Andronov-Hopf bifurcation.
Proof: Provided in appendix C.
Note that for φ > φˆ, the trace become positive and hence we have an unstable
equilibrium. However when φ < φˆ, the equilibrium is stable. When φ rises to φˆ,
the system with a stable equilibrium point loses its stability and gives birth to
a limit cycle. Similarly if φ falls to φˆ, the system with an unstable steady state
produces a limit cycle. This speed of adjustment parameter φ that is associated
with the change in financialization rate, among many other things, depends on
governments role on the (de)regulation of the financial markets. Higher the dereg-
ulation of the financial sector, higher is the speed of adjustment associated with
the change in financialization rate and hence higher is the possibility that the sta-
ble system losing its stability produces limit cycle. So government intervention for
a more regulated financial market is desirable for ensuring stability of the system
(economy).
3.3 Comparative Static:
In this sub-section we investigate how various parameters influence the equilibrium
values of technological progress and financialization rate.
3.3.1 Effect of a change in ξ0 :
Differentiating both side of the equation (3.2) w.r.t. ξ0 and rearranging we get,
P
∂λ
∂ξ0
+Q
∂Ω
∂ξ0
= −1 (3.16)
Differentiating both side of the equation (3.10) w.r.t. ξ0 and rearranging we get,
M
∂λ
∂ξ0
+N
∂Ω
∂ξ0
= 0 (3.17)
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where P =
(
ξ1
∂g
∂λ
− ξ3 ∂pi∂λ − 1
)
; Q =
[
ξ1
∂g
∂Ω
+ ξ2(1− 2Ω)− ξ3 ∂pi∂Ω
]
; M =
[
η1 + η2
∂g
∂λ
]
; N =
[
η2
∂g
∂Ω
− 1]
Rewriting equation (3.16) & (3.17) in matrix form we get,(
P Q
M N
)(
∂λ
∂ξ0
∂Ω
∂ξ0
)
=
(
−1
0
)
(3.18)
So,
∂λ
∂ξ0
=
−N
(NP −MQ) (3.19)
and
∂Ω
∂ξ0
=
M
(NP −MQ) (3.20)
Case 1.1:
Consider point A: Here P < 0, Q < 0, M > 0, N < 0. So from equation (3.16)
we get ∂λ
∂ξ0
= −N
(NP−MQ) > 0 and from equation (3.20) we can say
∂Ω
∂ξ0
= M
(NP−MQ) >
0. Thus as ξ0 increases, both the equilibrium value of λ? and Ω? upsurge and a
fall in ξ0 has a dwindling effect on both λ? and Ω?. When ∂g
?
∂λ
> 0, impact of a
rise in ξ0 on the long run equilibrium rate of capital accumulation is ambiguous
which is shown by the following equation.
dg?
dξ0
=

+︷︸︸︷
∂g?
∂λ
+︷︸︸︷
∂λ
∂ξ0
+
−︷︸︸︷
∂g?
∂Ω
+︷︸︸︷
∂Ω
∂ξ0
 R 0 (3.21)
However, if there is a strong wage-led growth regime i.e. if ∂g
?
∂λ
< 0, then the
impact of a rise in ξ0 on the long run equilibrium rate of capital accumulation is
unambiguously negative. It is captured by the following equation
dg?
dξ0
=

−︷︸︸︷
∂g?
∂λ
+︷︸︸︷
∂λ
∂ξ0
+
−︷︸︸︷
∂g?
∂Ω
+︷︸︸︷
∂Ω
∂ξ0
 < 0 (3.22)
The above analysis can be represented through diagram as well. The vertical inter-
cept of the λ˙ = 0 curve is λ
∣∣∣∣Ω=0
λ˙=0
= ξ0 + ξ1g(0)− ξ3pi(0). So partially differentiating
it with respect to ξ0 yields,
∂
(
λ
∣∣∣∣Ω=0
λ˙=0
)
∂ξ0
= 1 > 0. (3.23)
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Slope of the λ˙ = 0 isocline is dλ
dΩ
∣∣∣∣
λ˙=0
=
ξ1
∂g
∂Ω
+ξ2(1−2Ω)−ξ3 ∂pi∂Ω
1−ξ1 ∂g∂λ+ξ3 ∂pi∂λ
and so the slope in
invariant with respect to the change in ξ0. Thus when ξ0 rises, only the vertical
intercept increases. So due to a rise in ξ0, the λ˙ = 0 isocline shifts to the upward
direction. See figure 3.6(a).
Consider point B: Here P < 0, Q > 0, M > 0, N < 0. So from equation (3.16)
we get ∂λ
∂ξ0
= −N
(NP−MQ) > 0 and from equation (3.20) we can say
∂Ω
∂ξ0
= M
(NP−MQ) >
0. Therefore an expansion in ξ0 upsurges both the equilibrium value of λ? and
Ω? whereas a decline in ξ0 plummets the equilibrium value of λ? and Ω? together.
See figure 3.6(b) for the diagram. Here also when ∂g
?
∂λ
> 0 the impact of a rise in
ξ0 on the long run equilibrium rate of capital accumulation is ambiguous (which
is shown by equation 3.21) and if there is a strong wage-led growth regime (i.e. if
∂g?
∂λ
< 0), then the impact of a rise in ξ0 on the long run equilibrium rate of capital
accumulation is unambiguously negative.
So, from point A and B we can conclude that regardless of the initial value of the
financialization rate (i.e. whether Ω > Ω¯ or Ω < Ω¯), the effect of a rise in ξ0 is
expansionary for both the equilibrium value of λ? and Ω?.
Case 1.3:
Consider point D: Here P < 0, Q < 0, M > 0, N < 0. So from equation (3.16)
we get ∂λ
∂ξ0
= −N
(NP−MQ) > 0 and from equation (3.20) we can say
∂Ω
∂ξ0
= M
(NP−MQ) >
0. So ξ0 has a positive impact on both the equilibrium value of λ? and Ω?. It is
shown in figure 3.6(c). As case 1.1 given that ∂g
?
∂λ
> 0, here also the impact of a
rise in ξ0 on the equilibrium rate of capital accumulation is ambiguous. However,
in a strong wage-led growth regime the impact of a rise in ξ0 on the long run
equilibrium rate of capital accumulation is negative.
Note that if ξ0 decreases the two equilibria C and D come closer and hence the
stability corridor shrinks. Hence the economy is now more fragile and a shock
(which could previously be absorbed by the stable equilibrium point) can shift the
equilibrium from the stable to the saddle point. For a sufficient fall in ξ0, both the
equilibria can converge to a saddle point. See figure 3.6(d). So, we can infer that
in the period of stagnation, it’s the intra-class conflict among firms that plays an
important role. It is important not only for the new equilibrium level of λ? and
Ω? to achieve, but for ensuring the stability as well. In the period of stagnation,
a lower intra-class conflict among firms can shrink the stability corridor and for a
sufficiently low level of intra-class conflict, ultimately a saddle point can emerge.
Case 2.1:
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
(e)
Figure 3.6: Effect of a change in ξ0
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Here 1
η2
> ∂g
?
∂Ω
> 0. The analysis is same as case 1.1. However, when ∂g
?
∂λ
> 0,
a rise in ξ0 has a positive effect on the equilibrium rate of capital accumulation
which is shown in the following equation.
dg?
dξ0
=

+︷︸︸︷
∂g?
∂λ
+︷︸︸︷
∂λ
∂ξ0
+
+︷︸︸︷
∂g?
∂Ω
+︷︸︸︷
∂Ω
∂ξ0
 > 0 (3.24)
However, if there is a strong wage-led growth regime then the impact of a rise in
ξ0 on the long run equilibrium rate of capital accumulation is ambiguous. It is
captured by the following equation
dg?
dξ0
=

−︷︸︸︷
∂g?
∂λ
+︷︸︸︷
∂λ
∂ξ0
+
+︷︸︸︷
∂g?
∂Ω
+︷︸︸︷
∂Ω
∂ξ0
 R 0 (3.25)
Case 2.2:
The analysis is same as case 1.1 except the fact that as ∂g
?
dξ0
> 0, when ∂g
?
∂λ
> 0
impact of a rise in ξ0 on the long run equilibrium rate of capital accumulation is
positive while in a strong wage-led growth regime, the effect of a rise in ξ0 on the
long run equilibrium rate of capital accumulation is ambiguous.
Case 2.3:
The analysis is same as case 1.3 except the fact that as ∂Ω
dξ0
> 0, when ∂g
?
∂λ
> 0
impact of a rise in ξ0 on the long run equilibrium rate of capital accumulation is
positive while in a strong wage-led growth regime, the effect of a rise in ξ0 on the
long run equilibrium rate of capital accumulation is ambiguous.
Case 3.2/3.3:
Consider point F: Here P < 0, Q < 0, M > 0, N > 0. So from equation (3.16)
we get ∂λ
∂ξ0
= −N
(NP−MQ) < 0 and from equation (3.20) we can say
∂Ω
∂ξ0
= M
(NP−MQ) >
0. Thus for an increment in ξ0, the equilibrium value of Ω? rises but λ? falls and
for a decline in ξ0, the opposite happens. When ∂g
?
∂λ
> 0, the impact of a rise in
ξ0 on the equilibrium rate of capital accumulation is, however, ambiguous which
is encapsulated by the following equation.
dg?
dξ0
=

+︷︸︸︷
∂g?
∂λ
−︷︸︸︷
∂λ
∂ξ0
+
+︷︸︸︷
∂g?
∂Ω
+︷︸︸︷
∂Ω
∂ξ0
 R 0 (3.26)
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However, when ∂g
?
∂λ
< 0, the impact of a rise in ξ0 on the equilibrium rate of capital
accumulation is unambiguously positive.
Note that if ξ0 decreases, in case 3.3 the two equilibria E and F coming closer
shrinks the stability corridor and for an appropriate fall in ξ0, both the equilibria
unite to a saddle point. See figure 3.6(e).
3.3.2 Effect of a change in ξ1 :
Differentiating both side of the equation (3.2) w.r.t. ξ1 and rearranging we get,
P
∂λ
∂ξ1
+Q
∂Ω
∂ξ1
= −g (3.27)
Differentiating both side of the equation (3.10) w.r.t. ξ1 and rearranging we get,
M
∂λ
∂ξ1
+N
∂Ω
∂ξ1
= 0 (3.28)
where P =
(
ξ1
∂g
∂λ
− ξ3 ∂pi∂λ − 1
)
; Q =
[
ξ1
∂g
∂Ω
+ ξ2(1− 2Ω)− ξ3 ∂pi∂Ω
]
; M =
[
η1 + η2
∂g
∂λ
]
; N =
[
η2
∂g
∂Ω
− 1]
Rewriting equation (3.27) & (3.28) in matrix form we get,(
P Q
M N
)(
∂λ
∂ξ1
∂Ω
∂ξ1
)
=
(
−g
0
)
(3.29)
So,
∂λ
∂ξ1
=
−Ng
(NP −MQ) (3.30)
and
∂Ω
∂ξ1
=
Mg
(NP −MQ) (3.31)
Case 1.1:
Consider point A: Here P < 0, Q < 0, M > 0, N < 0. So from equation (3.27)
we get ∂λ
∂ξ1
= −Ng
(NP−MQ) > 0 and from equation (3.31) we can say
∂Ω
∂ξ1
= Mg
(NP−MQ) >
0. Subsequently, as ξ1 improves, both the equilibrium value of λ? and Ω? upsurge
and when ξ1 decreases, as a result we have a diminution in the equilibrium value
of both λ? and Ω?. The impact of a rise in ξ1 on the equilibrium rate of capital
accumulation, provided , is ambiguous which is encapsulated by the following
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equation.
dg?
dξ1
=

+︷︸︸︷
∂g?
∂λ
+︷︸︸︷
∂λ
∂ξ1
+
−︷︸︸︷
∂g?
∂Ω
+︷︸︸︷
∂Ω
∂ξ1
 R 0 (3.32)
However, when ∂g
?
∂λ
< 0, dg
?
dξ1
< 0.
The above analysis can be represented through diagram as well. The vertical inter-
cept of the λ˙ = 0 curve is λ
∣∣∣∣Ω=0
λ˙=0
= ξ0 + ξ1g(0)− ξ3pi(0). So partially differentiating
it with respect to ξ1 yields,
∂
(
λ
∣∣∣∣Ω=0
λ˙=0
)
∂ξ1
= g(0) > 0. (3.33)
We are not emphasizing on the slope of the λ˙ = 0 isocline as it is not changing
the qualitative result significantly. So due to a rise in ξ1, the λ˙ = 0 isocline shifts
to the upward direction.
Consider point B: Here P < 0, Q > 0, M > 0, N < 0. So from equation
(3.27) we get ∂λ
∂ξ1
= −Ng
(NP−MQ) > 0 and from equation (3.31) we can say
∂Ω
∂ξ1
=
Mg
(NP−MQ) > 0. Thus for an upsurge in ξ1, both the equilibrium value of λ
? and Ω?
improve whereas for a fall in ξ1, exactly the opposite happens. Here also, when the
economy is in profit-led or in a weak wage-led growth regime, the impact of a rise
in ξ1 on the long run equilibrium rate of capital accumulation is ambiguous (which
can be shown by the same equation (3.32). However, in a strong wage-led growth
regime, the impact of a rise in ξ1 on the equilibrium rate of capital accumulation
is unambiguously negative.
Case 1.3:
Consider point D: Here P < 0, Q < 0, M > 0, N < 0. So from equation
(3.27) we get ∂λ
∂ξ1
= −Ng
(NP−MQ) > 0 and from equation (3.31) we can say
∂Ω
∂ξ1
=
Mg
(NP−MQ) > 0. Therefore as ξ1 increases, both the equilibrium value of λ
? and Ω?
rise and when ξ1 decreases, the equilibrium value of both λ? and Ω? fall. It is to
be noted that for a reduction in ξ1 the two equilibria C and D move closer and for
an adequate fall in ξ1, both the equilibria by converging to each other generate a
saddle point. As case 1.1 given that ∂g
?
∂λ
> 0, here also the impact of a rise in ξ1 on
the equilibrium rate of capital accumulation is ambiguous. However, in a strong
wage-led growth regime the impact of a rise in ξ1 on the long run equilibrium rate
of capital accumulation is negative.
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Case 2.1:
Here 1
η2
> ∂g
?
∂Ω
> 0. The analysis is same as case 1.1. However, when ∂g
?
∂λ
> 0,
a rise in ξ1 has a positive effect on the equilibrium rate of capital accumulation
which is shown in the following equation.
dg?
dξ1
=

+︷︸︸︷
∂g?
∂λ
+︷︸︸︷
∂λ
∂ξ1
+
+︷︸︸︷
∂g?
∂Ω
+︷︸︸︷
∂Ω
∂ξ1
 > 0 (3.34)
However, if there is a strong wage-led growth regime then the impact of a rise in
ξ1 on the long run equilibrium rate of capital accumulation is ambiguous. It is
captured by the following equation
dg?
dξ1
=

−︷︸︸︷
∂g?
∂λ
+︷︸︸︷
∂λ
∂ξ1
+
+︷︸︸︷
∂g?
∂Ω
+︷︸︸︷
∂Ω
∂ξ1
 R 0 (3.35)
Case 2.2:
The analysis is same as case 1.1 except the fact that as ∂g
?
dΩ
> 0, when ∂g
?
∂λ
> 0
impact of a rise in ξ1 on the long run equilibrium rate of capital accumulation is
positive while in a strong wage-led growth regime, the effect of a rise in ξ1 on the
long run equilibrium rate of capital accumulation is ambiguous.
Case 2.3:
The analysis is same as case 2.2.
Case 3.2/3.3:
Consider point F: Here P < 0, Q < 0, M > 0, N > 0. So from equation (3.27)
we get ∂λ
∂ξ1
= −Ng
(NP−MQ) < 0 and from equation (3.31) we can say
∂Ω
∂ξ1
= Mg
(NP−MQ) >
0. Thus as ξ1 increases, there is an improvement in the equilibrium value of Ω?
while λ? deteriorates and a reduction in ξ1 leads , the opposite to happen. When
∂g?
∂λ
> 0, the impact of a rise in ξ1 on the equilibrium rate of capital accumulation
is, however, ambiguous which is encapsulated by the following equation.
dg?
dξ1
=

+︷︸︸︷
∂g?
∂λ
−︷︸︸︷
∂λ
∂ξ1
+
+︷︸︸︷
∂g?
∂Ω
+︷︸︸︷
∂Ω
∂ξ1
 R 0 (3.36)
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On the other hand, if ∂g
?
∂λ
< 0 an increase in ξ1 unambiguously upsurges the long
run equilibrium rate of capital accumulation.
It is worth remembering that a decline in ξ1 leads the two equilibria E and F to
come closer and for a sufficient diminution in ξ1, both the equilibria converge to a
saddle point.
3.3.3 Effect of a change in ξ3 :
Differentiating both side of the equation (3.2) w.r.t. ξ3 and rearranging we get,
P
∂λ
∂ξ3
+Q
∂Ω
∂ξ3
= pi (3.37)
Differentiating both side of the equation (3.10) w.r.t. ξ3 and rearranging we get,
M
∂λ
∂ξ3
+N
∂Ω
∂ξ3
= 0 (3.38)
where P =
(
ξ1
∂g
∂λ
− ξ3 ∂pi∂λ − 1
)
; Q =
[
ξ1
∂g
∂Ω
+ ξ2(1− 2Ω)− ξ3 ∂pi∂Ω
]
; M =
[
η1 + η2
∂g
∂λ
]
; N =
[
η2
∂g
∂Ω
− 1]
Rewriting equation (3.37) & (3.38) in matrix form we get,(
P Q
M N
)(
∂λ
∂ξ3
∂Ω
∂ξ3
)
=
(
pi
0
)
(3.39)
So,
∂λ
∂ξ3
=
piN
(NP −MQ) (3.40)
and
∂Ω
∂ξ3
=
−piM
(NP −MQ) (3.41)
Case 1.1:
Consider point A: Here P < 0, Q < 0, M > 0, N < 0. So from equation
(3.37) we get ∂λ
∂ξ3
= piN
(NP−MQ) < 0 and from equation (3.41) we can say
∂Ω
∂ξ3
=
−piM
(NP−MQ) < 0. Hence as ξ3 increases, both the equilibria (λ
? and Ω?) shrink and
for a diminution in ξ3, the reverse takes place. When the economy is in a profit-led
or weak wage-led growth regime, impact of a rise in ξ3 on the equilibrium rate of
capital accumulation is ambiguous (which is encapsulated by the next equation).
However, when there is a strong wage-led growth regime in the economy, a positive
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effect of a rise in ξ3 on the long run equilibrium rate of capital accumulation
prevails.
dg?
dξ3
=

+︷︸︸︷
∂g?
∂λ
−︷︸︸︷
∂λ
∂ξ3
+
−︷︸︸︷
∂g?
∂Ω
−︷︸︸︷
∂Ω
∂ξ3
 R 0 (3.42)
The above analysis can be represented through diagram as well (See figure 3.7(a)).
The vertical intercept of the λ˙ = 0 curve is λ
∣∣∣∣Ω=0
λ˙=0
= ξ0+ξ1g(0)−ξ3pi(0). So partially
differentiating it with respect to ξ3 yields,
∂
(
λ
∣∣∣∣Ω=0
λ˙=0
)
∂ξ3
= −pi(0) < 0. (3.43)
Slope of the λ˙ = 0 isocline is dλ
dΩ
∣∣∣∣
λ˙=0
=
ξ1
∂g
∂Ω
+ξ2(1−2Ω)−ξ3 ∂pi∂Ω
1−ξ1 ∂g∂λ+ξ3 ∂pi∂λ
and so the slope becomes
flatter for all Ω < Ω¯ and steeper for all Ω > Ω¯ as there is a rise in ξ3. So due to a
rise in ξ3, the λ˙ = 0 isocline shifts to the downward direction.
Consider point B: Here P < 0, Q > 0, M > 0, N < 0. So from equation (3.37)
we get ∂λ
∂ξ3
= piN
(NP−MQ) < 0 and from equation (3.41) we can say
∂Ω
∂ξ3
= −piM
(NP−MQ) <
0. Thus a fall in ξ3 results in an improvement in both the equilibrium value of λ?
and Ω? whereas an expansion in ξ3 brings about the contrary results. See figure
3.7(b) for the diagram. Under the profit-led or a weak wage-led growth regime,
the impact of a rise in ξ3 on the long run equilibrium rate of capital accumulation
is ambiguous (which can be shown by the same equation (3.42). However, under
a strong wage-led growth regime a positive effect of a rise in ξ3 on the long run
equilibrium rate of capital accumulation prevails.
Case 1.3:
Consider point D: Here P < 0, Q < 0, M > 0, N < 0. So from equation
(3.37) we get ∂λ
∂ξ3
= piN
(NP−MQ) < 0 and from equation (3.41) we can say
∂Ω
∂ξ3
=
−piM
(NP−MQ) < 0. As a consequence of an upsurge in ξ3, the equilibrium value of λ
?
and Ω? together shrink whereas a decrease in ξ3 results in the improvement in the
equilibrium value of both λ? and Ω?. Here also the impact of a rise in ξ3 on the
equilibrium rate of capital accumulation is same as case 1.1.
Note that a rise in ξ3 causes the two equilibria C and D to come closer and for an
appropriate rise in ξ3, both the equilibria congregate to a saddle point. See figure
3.7(c) for the diagram.
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(c)
(d)
Figure 3.7: Effect of a change in ξ3
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Case 2.1:
Here 1
η2
> ∂g
?
∂Ω
> 0. The analysis is same as case 1.1. However, a rise in ξ3
under the profit-led or a weak wage-led growth regime has a negative effect on the
equilibrium rate of capital accumulation which is shown in the following equation.
dg?
dξ3
=

+︷︸︸︷
∂g?
∂λ
−︷︸︸︷
∂λ
∂ξ3
+
+︷︸︸︷
∂g?
∂Ω
−︷︸︸︷
∂Ω
∂ξ3
 < 0 (3.44)
When ∂g
?
∂λ
< 0, a rise in ξ3 has an ambiguous effect on the equilibrium rate of
capital accumulation.
Case 2.2:
The analysis is same as case 1.1 except the fact that as ∂g
?
dΩ
> 0, when ∂g
?
∂λ
> 0
impact of a rise in ξ3 on the long run equilibrium rate of capital accumulation is
negative while in a strong wage-led growth regime, the effect of a rise in ξ1 on the
long run equilibrium rate of capital accumulation is ambiguous.
Case 2.3:
The analysis is same as case 2.2.
Case 3.2/3.3:
Consider point F: Here P < 0, Q < 0, M > 0, N > 0. So from equation (3.37)
we get ∂λ
∂ξ3
= piN
(NP−MQ) > 0 and from equation (3.41) we can say
∂Ω
∂ξ3
= −piM
(NP−MQ) <
0. Thus an expansion in ξ3 has a dwindling effect on Ω? whereas it upsurges the
equilibrium value of λ?. A deterioration in ξ3 leads the opposite occurring. The
impact of a rise in ξ3 on the equilibrium rate of capital accumulation under the
profit-led or a weak wage-led growth regime is ambiguous which is encapsulated
by the following equation
dg?
dξ3
=

+︷︸︸︷
∂g?
∂λ
+︷︸︸︷
∂λ
∂ξ3
+
+︷︸︸︷
∂g?
∂Ω
−︷︸︸︷
∂Ω
∂ξ3
 R 0 (3.45)
However, when the economy is in a strong wage-led growth regime, a rise in ξ3
leads to a deterioration on the long run equilibrium rate of capital accumulation.
Note that if ξ3 increases the two equilibria E and F come closer and for a sufficient
increment in ξ3, both the equilibria converge to a saddle point. See figure 3.7(d).
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3.3.4 Effect of a change in η0 :
Differentiating both side of the equation (3.2) w.r.t. η0 and rearranging we get,
P
∂λ
∂η0
+Q
∂Ω
∂η0
= 0 (3.46)
Differentiating both side of the equation (3.10) w.r.t. η0 and rearranging we get,
M
∂λ
∂η0
+N
∂Ω
∂η0
= 1 (3.47)
where P =
(
ξ1
∂g
∂λ
− ξ3 ∂pi∂λ − 1
)
; Q =
[
ξ1
∂g
∂Ω
+ ξ2(1− 2Ω)− ξ3 ∂pi∂Ω
]
; M =
[
η1 + η2
∂g
∂λ
]
; N =
[
η2
∂g
∂Ω
− 1]
Rewriting equation (3.46) & (3.47) in matrix form we get,(
P Q
M N
)(
∂λ
∂η0
∂Ω
∂η0
)
=
(
0
1
)
(3.48)
So,
∂λ
∂η0
=
−Q
(NP −MQ) (3.49)
and
∂Ω
∂η0
=
P
(NP −MQ) (3.50)
Case 1.1:
Consider point A: Here P < 0, Q < 0, M > 0, N < 0. So from equation (3.46)
we get ∂λ
∂η0
= −Q
(NP−MQ) > 0 and from equation (3.50) we can say
∂Ω
∂η0
= P
(NP−MQ) <
0. Thus as η0 increases, the equilibrium value of λ? rises while the equilibrium
value of Ω? falls. For a decrease in η0 exactly opposite happens. When dg
?
dλ
> 0,
the impact of a rise in η0 on the equilibrium rate of capital accumulation is,
however, unambiguously positive which is encapsulated by the following equation.
Nonetheless, when dg
?
dλ
< 0, a rise in η0 has an ambiguous effect on long run g?.
dg?
dη0
=

+︷︸︸︷
∂g?
∂λ
+︷︸︸︷
∂λ
∂η0
+
−︷︸︸︷
∂g?
∂Ω
−︷︸︸︷
∂Ω
∂η0
 > 0 (3.51)
The above analysis can be represented through diagram as well (See figure 3.8(a)).
The vertical intercept of the Ω˙ = 0 curve is λ
∣∣∣∣Ω=0
Ω˙=0
= η0−η2g(0)
η1
. So partially differ-
44
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(d)
Figure 3.8: Effect of a change in η0
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entiating it with respect to η0 yields
∂
λ
∣∣∣∣Ω=0
Ω˙=0

∂η0
= 1
η1
> 0. The horizontal intercept
for the Ω˙ = 0 isocline is Ω
∣∣∣∣λ=0
Ω˙=0
= η2g(λ = 0) − η0. So partially differentiating
it with respect to η0 yields
∂
Ω
∣∣∣∣λ=0
Ω˙=0

∂η0
= −1 < 0. Slope of the Ω˙ = 0 isocline is
dλ
dΩ
∣∣∣∣
Ω˙=0
=
1−η2 ∂g∂Ω
η1+η2
∂g
∂λ
and so the slope is invariant with respect to the change in η0.
Thus when η0 rises, the vertical intercept increases and the horizontal intercept
decreases.
Consider point B: Here P < 0, Q > 0, M > 0, N < 0. So from equation (3.46)
we get ∂λ
∂η0
= −Q
(NP−MQ) < 0 and from equation (3.50) we can say
∂Ω
∂η0
= P
(NP−MQ) <
0. Thus as η0 decreases, both the equilibrium value of λ? and Ω? rise and when η0
increases, the equilibrium value of both λ? and Ω? fall. See figure 3.8(b) for the
diagram. The impact of a rise in η0 on the equilibrium rate of capital accumulation
under the profit-led or a weak wage-led growth regime is ambiguous which can be
represented by the following equation as
dg?
dη0
=

+︷︸︸︷
∂g?
∂λ
−︷︸︸︷
∂λ
∂η0
+
−︷︸︸︷
∂g?
∂Ω
−︷︸︸︷
∂Ω
∂η0
 R 0 (3.52)
Nonetheless, under a strong wage-led growth regime a rise in η0 has a positive
effect on the long run equilibrium rate of capital accumulation.
Case 1.3:
Consider point D: Here P < 0, Q < 0, M > 0, N < 0. So from equation (3.46)
we get ∂λ
∂η0
= −Q
(NP−MQ) > 0 and from equation (3.50) we can say
∂Ω
∂η0
= P
(NP−MQ) <
0. Thus as η0 increases, the equilibrium value of λ? rises and Ω? falls and when
η0 decreases, the equilibrium value of both λ? reduces and Ω? rises. A rise in η0
on the equilibrium rate of capital accumulation has same effect as point A of case
1.1.
Note that if η0 increases the two equilibria C and D come closer and for a sufficient
fall in η0, both the equilibria converge to a saddle point. See figure 3.8(c).
Case 2.1:
Here 1
η2
> ∂g
?
∂Ω
> 0. The analysis is same as case 1.1. However, when dg
?
dλ
> 0, a
rise in η0 has an ambiguous effect on the equilibrium rate of capital accumulation
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for point A which is shown in by the following equation as
dg?
dη0
=

+︷︸︸︷
∂g?
∂λ
+︷︸︸︷
∂λ
∂η0
+
+︷︸︸︷
∂g?
∂Ω
−︷︸︸︷
∂Ω
∂η0
 R 0 (3.53)
However, when dg
?
dλ
< 0, the effect of a rise in η0 on the long run equilibrium rate
of capital accumulation is unambiguously negative.
On the other hand, for point B, when dg
?
dλ
> 0, a rise in η0 has an unambiguously
negative effect on the equilibrium rate of capital accumulation (which is shown
in by the following equation) while in a strong wage-led growth regime η0 has an
ambiguous effect on the long run g?.
dg?
dη0
=

+︷︸︸︷
∂g?
∂λ
−︷︸︸︷
∂λ
∂η0
+
+︷︸︸︷
∂g?
∂Ω
−︷︸︸︷
∂Ω
∂η0
 < 0 (3.54)
Case 2.2:
The analysis is same as case 1.1 except the fact that here for point A, as ∂g
?
dΩ
> 0,
when ∂g
?
∂λ
> 0 impact of a rise in η0 on the long run equilibrium rate of capital
accumulation is ambiguous while in a strong wage-led growth regime, the effect of a
rise in η0 on the long run equilibrium rate of capital accumulation is unambiguously
negative.
However, for point B, when ∂g
?
∂λ
> 0 impact of a rise in η0 on the long run equi-
librium rate of capital accumulation is unambiguously negative while in a strong
wage-led growth regime, the effect of a rise in η0 on the long run equilibrium rate
of capital accumulation is ambiguous.
Case 2.3:
The analysis is same as case 1.3 except the fact that at point D, when ∂g
?
∂λ
> 0, the
impact of a rise in η0 on the equilibrium rate of capital accumulation is ambiguous,
while in the strong wage-led growth regime, the impact of a rise in η0 on the
equilibrium rate of capital accumulation is unambiguously negative.
Case 3.2/3.3:
Consider point F: Here P < 0, Q < 0, M > 0, N > 0. So from equation
(3.46) we get ∂λ
∂η0
= −Q
(NP−MQ) > 0 and from equation (3.50) we can say
∂Ω
∂η0
=
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P
(NP−MQ) < 0. Thus as η0 increases, the equilibrium value of λ
? rises and Ω? falls
and when η0 decreases, the equilibrium value of λ? reduces and Ω? rises. Here,
under the profit-led or a weak wage-led growth regime the impact of a rise in η0 on
the equilibrium rate of capital accumulation is unambiguous and is encapsulated
by the following equation as
dg?
dη0
=

+︷︸︸︷
∂g?
∂λ
+︷︸︸︷
∂λ
∂η0
+
+︷︸︸︷
∂g?
∂Ω
−︷︸︸︷
∂Ω
∂η0
 R 0 (3.55)
However, under the strong wage-led growth regime there is a negative effect of a
rise in η0 on the long run equilibrium rate of capital accumulation.
Note that if η0 increases the two equilibria E and F come closer and for a sufficient
fall in η0, both the equilibria converge to a saddle point. See figure 3.8(d) for the
diagram.
3.3.5 Effect of a change in η1 :
Differentiating both side of the equation (3.2) w.r.t. η1 and rearranging we get,
P
∂λ
∂η1
+Q
∂Ω
∂η1
= 0 (3.56)
Differentiating both side of the equation (3.10) w.r.t. η1 and rearranging we get,
M
∂λ
∂η1
+N
∂Ω
∂η1
= −λ (3.57)
where P =
(
ξ1
∂g
∂λ
− ξ3 ∂pi∂λ − 1
)
; Q =
[
ξ1
∂g
∂Ω
+ ξ2(1− 2Ω)− ξ3 ∂pi∂Ω
]
; M =
[
η1 + η2
∂g
∂λ
]
; N =
[
η2
∂g
∂Ω
− 1]
Rewriting equation (3.56) & (3.57) in matrix form we get,(
P Q
M N
)(
∂λ
∂η1
∂Ω
∂η1
)
=
(
0
−λ
)
(3.58)
So,
∂λ
∂η1
=
λQ
(NP −MQ) (3.59)
and
∂Ω
∂η1
=
−λP
(NP −MQ) (3.60)
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Case 1.1:
Consider point A: Here P < 0, Q < 0, M > 0, N < 0. So from equation (3.56)
we get ∂λ
∂η1
= λQ
(NP−MQ) < 0 and from equation (3.60) we can say
∂Ω
∂η1
= −λP
(NP−MQ) >
0. Thus as η1 increases, the equilibrium value of λ? falls and Ω? rises and when η1
decreases, the equilibrium value of λ? increases and Ω? falls. When dg
?
dλ
> 0, the
impact of a rise in η1 on the equilibrium rate of capital accumulation is, however,
unambiguously negative which is encapsulated by equation (3.61). Nonetheless,
when dg
?
dλ
< 0, a rise in η1 has an ambiguous effect on long run g?.
dg?
dη1
=

+︷︸︸︷
∂g?
∂λ
−︷︸︸︷
∂λ
∂η1
+
−︷︸︸︷
∂g?
∂Ω
+︷︸︸︷
∂Ω
∂η1
 < 0 (3.61)
The above analysis can be represented through diagram as well (see figure 3.9(a)).
The vertical intercept of the Ω˙ = 0 curve is λ
∣∣∣∣Ω=0
Ω˙=0
= η0−η2g(0)
η1
. So partially differ-
entiating it with respect to η1 yields,
∂
(
λ
∣∣∣∣Ω=0
Ω˙=0
)
∂η1
= −η0 − η2g(0)
η21
> 0 (as η0 − η2g(0) < 0 here) (3.62)
The horizontal intercept for the Ω˙ = 0 isocline is Ω
∣∣∣∣λ=0
Ω˙=0
= η2g(λ = 0) − η0. So
partially differentiating it with respect to η1 yields,
∂
(
Ω
∣∣∣∣λ=0
Ω˙=0
)
∂η1
= 0 (3.63)
Slope of the Ω˙ = 0 isocline is dλ
dΩ
∣∣∣∣
Ω˙=0
=
1−η2 ∂g∂Ω
η1+η2
∂g
∂λ
and so the slope decreases with
respect to the change in η1. Thus when η1 rises, the vertical intercept increases,
slope decreases and at the same time the horizontal intercept remains unchanged.
So due to a rise in η1, the Ω˙ = 0 isocline pivots around the horizontal intercept
clockwise.
Consider point B: Here P < 0, Q > 0, M > 0, N < 0. So from equation (3.56)
we get ∂λ
∂η1
= λQ
(NP−MQ) > 0 and from equation (3.60) we can say
∂Ω
∂η1
= −λP
(NP−MQ) >
0.
Thus as η1 increases, both the equilibrium value of λ? and Ω? rise and when η1
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Figure 3.9: Effect of a change in η1
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decreases, the equilibrium value of both λ? and Ω? fall. See figure 3.9(b) for the
diagram. The impact of a rise in η1 on the equilibrium rate of capital accumulation
under the profit-led or a weak wage-led growth regime is ambiguous which can be
represented by the following equation as
dg?
dη1
=

+︷︸︸︷
∂g?
∂λ
+︷︸︸︷
∂λ
∂η1
+
−︷︸︸︷
∂g?
∂Ω
+︷︸︸︷
∂Ω
∂η1
 R 0 (3.64)
Nonetheless, under a strong wage-led growth regime a rise in η1 has negative effect
on the long run equilibrium rate of capital accumulation.
Case 1.3:
Consider point D: Here P < 0, Q < 0, M > 0, N < 0. So from equation (3.56)
we get ∂λ
∂η1
= λQ
(NP−MQ) < 0 and from equation (3.60) we can say
∂Ω
∂η1
= −λP
(NP−MQ) >
0. Thus as η1 increases, the equilibrium value of λ? decreases and Ω? rises (see
figure 3.9(c)) and when η1 decreases, the opposite happens. A rise in η1 on the
equilibrium rate of capital accumulation has same effect as point A of case 1.1.
Note that if η1 decreases the two equilibria C andD come closer and for a sufficient
fall in η1, both the equilibria converge to a saddle point. See figure 3.9(d) for the
anagrammatic explanation.
Case 2.1:
Here 1
η2
> ∂g
?
∂Ω
> 0. The analysis is same as case 1.1. However, when dg
?
dλ
> 0, a
rise in η1 has an ambiguous effect on the equilibrium rate of capital accumulation
for point A which is shown in by the following equation as
dg?
dη1
=

+︷︸︸︷
∂g?
∂λ
−︷︸︸︷
∂λ
∂η1
+
+︷︸︸︷
∂g?
∂Ω
+︷︸︸︷
∂Ω
∂η1
 R 0 (3.65)
However, when dg
?
dλ
< 0, the effect of a rise in η1 on the long run equilibrium rate
of capital accumulation is unambiguously positive.
On the other hand, for point B, when dg
?
dλ
> 0, a rise in η1 has an unambiguously
positive effect on the equilibrium rate of capital accumulation (which is shown in
by equation (3.66)) while in a strong wage-led growth regime η1 has an ambiguous
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effect on the long run g?.
dg?
dη1
=

+︷︸︸︷
∂g?
∂λ
+︷︸︸︷
∂λ
∂η1
+
+︷︸︸︷
∂g?
∂Ω
+︷︸︸︷
∂Ω
∂η1
 > 0 (3.66)
Case 2.2:
The analysis is same as case 1.1 except the fact that here for point A, as ∂g
?
dΩ
> 0,
when ∂g
?
∂λ
> 0 impact of a rise in η1 on the long run equilibrium rate of capital
accumulation is ambiguous while in a strong wage-led growth regime, the effect of a
rise in η1 on the long run equilibrium rate of capital accumulation is unambiguously
positive.
However, for point B, when ∂g
?
∂λ
> 0 impact of a rise in η1 on the long run equi-
librium rate of capital accumulation is unambiguously positive while in a strong
wage-led growth regime, the effect of a rise in η1 on the long run equilibrium rate
of capital accumulation is ambiguous.
Case 2.3:
The analysis is same as case 1.3 except the fact that at point D, when ∂g
?
∂λ
> 0, the
impact of a rise in η1 on the equilibrium rate of capital accumulation is ambiguous,
while in the strong wage-led growth regime, the impact of a rise in η1 on the
equilibrium rate of capital accumulation is unambiguously positive.
Case 3.2/3.3:
Consider point F: Here P < 0, Q < 0, M > 0, N > 0. So from equation
(3.56) we get ∂λ
∂η1
= λQ
(NP−MQ) < 0 and from equation (3.60) we can say
∂Ω
∂η1
=
−λP
(NP−MQ) > 0. Thus as η1 increases, the equilibrium value of λ
? decreases and
Ω? rises and when η1 decreases, the opposite happens. Here, under the profit-led
or a weak wage-led growth regime the impact of a rise in η1 on the equilibrium
rate of capital accumulation is unambiguous and is encapsulated by the following
equation as
dg?
dη1
=

+︷︸︸︷
∂g?
∂λ
−︷︸︸︷
∂λ
∂η1
+
+︷︸︸︷
∂g?
∂Ω
+︷︸︸︷
∂Ω
∂η1
 R 0 (3.67)
However, under the strong wage-led growth regime there is a positive effect of a
rise in η1 on the long run equilibrium rate of capital accumulation.
Note that if η1 decreases the two equilibria E and F come closer and for a sufficient
fall in η1, both the equilibria converge to a saddle node. See figure 3.9(e).
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Proposition 13: For an appropriate value of η1, the characteristic equa-
tion to (3.2) & (3.10) evaluated at the steady state G of the case 1.3
and/or 3.3 has one zero root and for the same dynamical system, η1 = ηˆ1
provides a point of saddle-node bifurcation.
Proof: Provided in appendix D. 
This proposition ensures that there is only one path which is stable whereas the
rest are unstable. This causes the transition between stability and instability of
the equilibrium.
3.3.6 Effect of a change in η2 :
Differentiating both side of the equation (3.2) w.r.t. η2 and rearranging we get,
P
∂λ
∂η2
+Q
∂Ω
∂η2
= 0 (3.68)
Differentiating both side of the equation (3.10) w.r.t. η2 and rearranging we get,
M
∂λ
∂η2
+N
∂Ω
∂η2
= −g (3.69)
where P =
(
ξ1
∂g
∂λ
− ξ3 ∂pi∂λ − 1
)
; Q =
[
ξ1
∂g
∂Ω
+ ξ2(1− 2Ω)− ξ3 ∂pi∂Ω
]
; M =
[
η1 + η2
∂g
∂λ
]
; N =
[
η2
∂g
∂Ω
− 1]
Rewriting equation (3.68) & (3.69) in matrix form we get,(
P Q
M N
)(
∂λ
∂η2
∂Ω
∂η2
)
=
(
0
−g
)
(3.70)
So,
∂λ
∂η2
=
gQ
(NP −MQ) (3.71)
and
∂Ω
∂η2
=
−gP
(NP −MQ) (3.72)
Case 1.1:
Consider point A: Here P < 0, Q < 0, M > 0, N < 0. So from equation
(3.68) we get ∂λ
∂η2
= gQ
(NP−MQ) < 0 and from equation (3.72) we can say
∂Ω
∂η2
=
−gP
(NP−MQ) > 0. Thus as η2 increases, the equilibrium value of λ
? falls and Ω? rises
and when η2 decreases, the equilibrium value of λ? increases and Ω? falls. When
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dg?
dλ
> 0, the impact of a rise in η1 on the equilibrium rate of capital accumulation is,
however, unambiguously negative which is encapsulated by the following equation.
Nonetheless, when dg
?
dλ
< 0, a rise in η0 has an ambiguous effect on long run g?.
dg?
dη2
=

+︷︸︸︷
∂g?
∂λ
−︷︸︸︷
∂λ
∂η2
+
−︷︸︸︷
∂g?
∂Ω
+︷︸︸︷
∂Ω
∂η2
 < 0 (3.73)
The above analysis can be represented through diagram as well (see figure 3.10(a)).
The vertical intercept of the Ω˙ = 0 curve is λ
∣∣∣∣Ω=0
Ω˙=0
= η0−η2g(0)
η1
. So partially dif-
ferentiating it with respect to η2 yields
∂
λ
∣∣∣∣Ω=0
Ω˙=0

∂η2
= −g(0)
η1
< 0. The horizontal
intercept for the Ω˙ = 0 isocline is Ω
∣∣∣∣λ=0
Ω˙=0
= η2g(λ = 0)− η0. So partially differen-
tiating it with respect to η2 yields
∂
Ω
∣∣∣∣λ=0
Ω˙=0

∂η2
= g(0). Slope of the Ω˙ = 0 isocline
is dλ
dΩ
∣∣∣∣
Ω˙=0
=
1−η2 ∂g∂Ω
η1+η2
∂g
∂λ
and so the change in slope is ambiguous with respect to the
change in η2. Thus, finally we can conclude that when η2 rises, the Ω˙ = 0 isocline
shifts toward rightward direction (although the shift may not be parallel).
Consider point B: Here P < 0, Q > 0, M > 0, N < 0. So from equation (3.68)
we get ∂λ
∂η2
= gQ
(NP−MQ) > 0 and from equation (3.72) we can say
∂Ω
∂η2
= −gP
(NP−MQ) >
0. Thus as η2 increases, both the equilibrium value of λ? and Ω? rise and when η2
decreases, the equilibrium value of both λ? and Ω? fall. See figure 3.10(b) for the
diagram. The impact of a rise in η2 on the equilibrium rate of capital accumulation
under the profit-led or a weak wage-led growth regime is ambiguous which can be
represented by the following equation as
dg?
dη2
=

+︷︸︸︷
∂g?
∂λ
+︷︸︸︷
∂λ
∂η2
+
−︷︸︸︷
∂g?
∂Ω
+︷︸︸︷
∂Ω
∂η2
 R 0 (3.74)
Nonetheless, under a strong wage-led growth regime a rise in η2 has a negative
effect on the long run equilibrium rate of capital accumulation.
Case 1.3:
Consider point D: Here P < 0, Q < 0, M > 0, N < 0. So from equation (3.68)
we get ∂λ
∂η2
= uQ
(NP−MQ) < 0 and from equation (3.72) we can say
∂Ω
∂η2
= −uP
(NP−MQ) >
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Figure 3.10: Effect of a change in η2
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0. Thus as η2 increases, the equilibrium value of λ? falls and Ω? rises (see figure
3.10(c)) and when η2 decreases, the equilibrium value of λ? rises and Ω? falls. A
rise in η1 on the equilibrium rate of capital accumulation has same effect as point
A of case 1.1.
Note that if η2 decreases the two equilibria C andD come closer and for a sufficient
fall in η2, both the equilibria converge to a saddle point. See figure 3.10(d).
Case 2.1:
Here 1
η2
> ∂g
?
∂Ω
> 0. The analysis is same as case 1.1. However, when dg
?
dλ
> 0, a
rise in η2 has an ambiguous effect on the equilibrium rate of capital accumulation
for point A which is shown in by the following equation as
dg?
dη2
=

+︷︸︸︷
∂g?
∂λ
−︷︸︸︷
∂λ
∂η2
+
+︷︸︸︷
∂g?
∂Ω
+︷︸︸︷
∂Ω
∂η2
 R 0 (3.75)
However, when dg
?
dλ
< 0, the effect of a rise in η2 on the long run equilibrium rate
of capital accumulation is unambiguously positive.
On the other hand, for point B, when dg
?
dλ
> 0, a rise in η2 has an unambiguously
positive effect on the equilibrium rate of capital accumulation (which is shown in
by equation (3.76)) while in a strong wage-led growth regime η2 has an ambiguous
effect on the long run g?.
dg?
dη2
=

+︷︸︸︷
∂g?
∂λ
+︷︸︸︷
∂λ
∂η2
+
+︷︸︸︷
∂g?
∂Ω
+︷︸︸︷
∂Ω
∂η2
 > 0 (3.76)
Case 2.2:
The analysis is same as case 1.1 except the fact that here for point A, as ∂g
?
dΩ
> 0,
when ∂g
?
∂λ
> 0 impact of a rise in η2 on the long run equilibrium rate of capital
accumulation is ambiguous while in a strong wage-led growth regime, the effect of a
rise in η2 on the long run equilibrium rate of capital accumulation is unambiguously
positive.
However, for point B, when ∂g
?
∂λ
> 0 impact of a rise in η2 on the long run equi-
librium rate of capital accumulation is unambiguously positive while in a strong
wage-led growth regime, the effect of a rise in η2 on the long run equilibrium rate
of capital accumulation is ambiguous.
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Case 2.3:
The analysis is same as case 1.3 except the fact that at point D, when ∂g
?
∂λ
> 0, the
impact of a rise in η2 on the equilibrium rate of capital accumulation is ambiguous,
while in the strong wage-led growth regime, the impact of a rise in η2 on the
equilibrium rate of capital accumulation is unambiguously positive.
Case 3.2/3.3:
Consider point F: Here P < 0, Q < 0, M > 0, N > 0. So from equation
(3.68) we get ∂λ
∂η2
= gQ
(NP−MQ) < 0 and from equation (3.72) we can say
∂Ω
∂η2
=
−gP
(NP−MQ) > 0. Thus as η2 increases, the equilibrium value of Ω
? rises but λ? falls
and when η2 decreases, the opposite happens. Here, under the profit-led or a weak
wage-led growth regime the impact of a rise in η2 on the equilibrium rate of capital
accumulation is unambiguous and is encapsulated by the following equation as
dg?
dη2
=

+︷︸︸︷
∂g?
∂λ
−︷︸︸︷
∂λ
∂η2
+
+︷︸︸︷
∂g?
∂Ω
+︷︸︸︷
∂Ω
∂η2
 R 0 (3.77)
However, under the strong wage-led growth regime there is a positive effect of a
rise in η2 on the long run equilibrium rate of capital accumulation.
Note that if η2 decreases the two equilibria E and F come closer and for a sufficient
fall in η2, both the equilibria converge to a saddle point. See figure 3.10(e).
4 Conclusion:
In this paper we deal with a post-Kaleckian growth model in which in the long run
technological progress and the financialization rate evolve endogenously. First, we
examine the short-run stability condition and comparative statics. We observe
that in the economy, both wage-led and profit-led demand regimes as well as
growth regimes are possible. When the consumption propensity of the rentiers
is greater than the responsiveness of investment demand to a unit change in dis-
tributed profit (which ensures the economy to be in the wage-led demand regime),
a higher ‘finance channel’ is sufficient to ensure an expansionary effect of financial-
ization on the aggregate demand provided that it is sufficiently strong compared
to the other two channels. Similarly, when rentiers’ consumption propensity is
smaller than the responsiveness of the investment demand to a unit change in
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distributed profits, financialization has a contractionary effect on the aggregate
demand. These results are not explicitly mentioned in Hein (2012a). Nonetheless,
one can easily derive these results from Hein as well.
Consistent with Hein (2012a), we find that the following conditions together ensure
the impact of financialization on capital accumulation to be expansionary: (i) a low
propensity to save out of rentiers’ income, (ii) weak effects of distributed profits on
firms’ investment decisions, (iii) comparatively lower importance of the ‘preference
channel’ for firms’ investment decisions relative to the ‘finance channel’, and (iv)
a high responsiveness of investment to the profit share. Otherwise financialization
has a contractionary effect on the capital accumulation.
Unlike Hein (2012a), we also find that the impact of an improvement in techno-
logical progress on the aggregate demand and on the equilibrium rate of capital
accumulation is ambiguous and depends on the very regime the economy is in.
The main departure of our analysis from the earlier literature, however, is that
in the long run, along with the rate of technological progress, we endogenize the
financialization rate as well. In the long-run, we find richer dynamics than Hein
(2012a). Unlike Hein (2012a)(where the equilibrium is unique), in our paper we
find that multiple equilibria may arise. Because of the incorporation of the finan-
cialization dynamics, unlike Hein (2012a), we also find that the interaction between
technological progress and financialization dynamics can lead to instability in the
economy.
We find few other interesting results as well. First, for a fixed value of the fi-
nancialization rate, the steady state rate of technological progress is stable. On
the other hand, in the absence of technological change (or for a fixed value of the
rate of technological progress), a contractionary effect of financialization on aggre-
gate demand implies a stable steady state financialization rate. However in case
of an expansionary effect of financialization on aggregate demand, an unstable
equilibrium financialization rate is possible.
Second, for a sufficiently high and expansionary effect of financialization on the ag-
gregate demand, under certain conditions, when the diffusion rate of technological
innovations is critically low (because of stringent intellectual property rights and
so on), the economy loses its stability and gives birth to a limit cycle. This very
result of ours, in this context, is in contrast to Bhaduri (2006b). The conclusion in
Bhaduri (2006b) is that faster diffusion rate of technological innovations is impor-
tant for fueling the accumulation rate whereas it has potential to simultaneously
destabilize the steady growth path. In our model under certain conditions, on the
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contrary, higher speed of diffusion of technological innovations is not necessary for
fueling growth but is important for stabilizing the economy itself. So, for ensuring
stability in the economy, government (or institutional) intervention for weakening
the stringent intellectual property rights are desirable. Similarly, under the above
conditions, when the speed of deregulation of the financial market is very high
the economy can loose its stability and a limit cycle can emerge. As a result, for
ensuring stability in the economy more regulated financial markets are desirable.
Third, when the economy is in stagnation, intra-class conflict among firms plays
an important role not only for achieving new equilibrium level of technological
progress and financialization rate, but also for ensuring stability in the economy.
In the period of stagnation, lower intra-class conflict among firms can shrink the
stability corridor and for a sufficiently low level of intra-class conflict, ultimately
a saddle point for the steady state of the economy can emerge.
Fourth, for a sufficiently high and expansionary effect of financialization on the
aggregate demand, under certain conditions, a lower value of the responsiveness
of the desired financialization rate to a unit change in the rate of technological
progress can shrink the stability corridor of the steady state of the economy and
can potentially lead to the emergence of saddle-node bifurcation (i.e. it ultimately
can cause the transition between stability and instability of the equilibrium).
The analysis in this paper, however, has some limitations. First, in our model,
households indebtedness has not been captured; this is important in the context
of recent financial crisis, households borrowing plays a major role. Second, we
have assumed the share of profit to be fixed. A more interesting, powerful, and
realistic explanation is possible if we endogenize the share of profit as well. Finally,
our model is based on closed economy without a role for government intervention.
These issues are left for future research.
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Appendix
A Proof of Proposition 10
Proof. Suppose λ
∣∣∣∣Ω=0
Ω˙=0
= η0−η2g(0)
η1
> λ
∣∣∣∣Ω=0
λ˙=0
= ξ0 + ξ1g(0) − ξ3pi(0) and ∂g?∂Ω < 0.
This ensures N < 0. For case 1.1 & 1.2 P < 0 (by assumption), Q R 0 (as Ω R Ω¯)
and M > 0. From above three types of different points we can conclude that
Det(J) > 0 and tr(J) < 0 and so for all the possible cases the equilibrium points
are stable.
Now suppose λ
∣∣∣∣Ω=0
Ω˙=0
= η0−η2g(0)
η1
> λ
∣∣∣∣Ω=0
λ˙=0
= ξ0 + ξ1g(0)− ξ3pi(0) and 0 < ∂g?∂Ω < 1η2 .
This ensures N < 0. For case 2.1 & 2.2 P < 0 (by assumption), Q R 0 (as Ω R Ω¯)
and M > 0. From above three types of different points we can conclude that
Det(J) > 0 and tr(J) < 0 and so for all the possible cases the equilibrium points
are stable. 
B Proof of Proposition 11
Proof. Differentiating the trace of the Jacobian matrix with respect to θ and then
evaluating it at θ = 0 we get,
∂(trJ)
∂θ
=
[
ξ1
∂g
∂λ
− 1
]
< 0
So the trace is smooth, differentiable and monotonically decreasing in the speed
of adjustment, θ. The trace disappears at θ = θˆ where θˆ =
−φ[η2 ∂g∂Ω−1]
ξ1
∂g
∂λ
−1 > 0. So
the characteristic equation has purely imaginary roots at θ = θˆ and the transver-
sality condition is satisfied. Hence, θ = θˆ provides a point of Andronov-Hopf
bifurcation.
C Proof of Proposition 12
Proof. Differentiating the trace of the Jacobian matrix with respect to φ and then
evaluating it at φ = 0 we get,
∂(trJ)
∂φ
=
[
η2
∂g
∂Ω
− 1
]
> 0
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So the trace is smooth, differentiable and monotonically increasing in the speed
of adjustment, φ. The trace disappears at φ = φˆ where φˆ =
−θ[ξ1 ∂g∂λ−1]
η2
∂g
∂Ω
−1 > 0. So
the characteristic equation has purely imaginary roots at φ = φˆ and the transver-
sality condition is satisfied. Hence, φ = φˆ provides a point of Andronov-Hopf
bifurcation.
D Proof of Proposition 13
Proof. At point G, the slope of the Ω˙ = 0 curve is equal to the slope of the λ˙ = 0
curve, i.e.
dλ
dΩ
∣∣∣∣
λ˙=0
=
dλ
dΩ
∣∣∣∣
d˙=0
⇒ θφ(PN −QM) = 0
So the determinant of the Jacobian matrix detJ = 0. So one of the two eigenvalues
is zero.
NP = MQ
⇒ η1 = ηˆ1 =
{ (
ξ1
∂g
∂λ
− 1) (η2 ∂g∂Ω − 1)
ξ1
∂g
∂Ω
+ ξ2(1− 2Ω)− ξ3 ∂pi∂Ω
}
−
(
η2
∂g
∂λ
)
(D.1)
Above equation must be evaluated at point G.
Differentiating λ˙ (of equation 3.2) w.r.t. η1 we get
∂λ˙
∂η1
∣∣∣∣
(λ?,Ω?)evaluated at point G
= 0 (D.2)
Differentiating Ω˙ (of equation 3.10) w.r.t. η1 we get
∂Ω˙
∂η1
∣∣∣∣
(λ?,Ω?)evaluated at point G
= φλ
Above equation when evaluated at (λ?,Ω?; η1) at point G provides non-zero value.
So the vector
(
∂λ˙
∂η1
∂Ω˙
∂η1
)
(λ?,Ω?)evaluated at point G
6= 0. So the non-hyperbolicity and
transversality conditions both are satisfied. Thus when η1 decreases to ηˆ1, the
saddle-node bifurcation occurs.
65
